| Testimony
of Consumers Union before the Texas Sunset Commission on Sunset
review of the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy (Nov.
2002).
Consumers Union appreciates the opportunity to offer testimony
regarding sunset review of the Texas State Board of Public
Accountancy. I am Rob Schneider, Senior Staff Attorney at
Consumers Union's Southwest Regional Office.
Half of U.S. households have funds in the stock market, many
in investments for retirement. So, investor confidence and
protection affects many Texans. Independent, reliable audits
are a crucial element of investor confidence and investor
protection.
This is an important time for restoring investor confidence,
given the financial scandals that have damaged it. Consumers
Union supports both state and federal measures to protect
the public from any further accounting disaster, and we support
changes to strengthen oversight to restore investor confidence
and assure investor protection. It is important to improve
oversight by the Board of Public Accountancy of regulated
public accountants, and to remove the financial conflict of
interest for auditors who are licensed as public accountants
under Texas law.
Improving Oversight by the Board of Public Accountancy
We support the recommendations made by the Sunset staff designed
to strengthen the Public Accountancy Act. Particularly, we
agree with excluding non-board members from membership on
policymaking committees (Recommendation 2.3), and requiring
the Board to make detailed information about disciplinary
actions available to the public (Recommendation 3.4).
We support changing the makeup of the Board to include majority
public membership. Public governance of regulatory agencies
assures the agencies policies are more independent of the
regulated industry. In addition, we support whistle-blower
protections to the Public Accountancy Act to protect individuals
who report fraudulent accounting practices.
We also recommend additional evaluation of the peer-review
system. The peer-review system assures that accountants are
performing audit functions properly by having other accountants
review their work. Though the Board has a hand in establishing
the standards for review, there is no point at which a regulator
-- solely charged with protecting the public interest -- actually
performs a review.
In other areas where public confidence in the stability and
solvency of companies is at stake, banking or insurance, for
example, audits are performed by state regulators. Under Sarbanes-Oxley,
an inspection process for accounting firms that audit nationally
traded corporations will be implemented. We understand this
is a major function of the Board's oversight program. However,
Texas should carefully scrutinize the peer-review system to
be sure it promotes the highest standards of review of auditing
functions.
Eliminating Financial Conflict of Interest for Auditors
Licensed as Public Accountants
Audit Fees May Undermine Auditor Independence
An analysis by the Wall Street Journal shows that audit firms
are collecting non-audit fees of nearly three times the size
of their audit fees. The analysis examined 21 of 30 companies
in the Dow Jones Industrial Average who filed proxy statements
by early April 2002. These companies paid total fees of $725.7
million to their audit firms. Only 27% of the total was paid
for audit services, the other 73% was paid to audit firms
for non-audit services. Auditors Still Perform Nonaudit Services,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, April 3, 2002, p. C1.
According to Business Week: "That accountants have become
increasingly dependent on consulting is clear. In 1993, 31%
of the industry's fees came from consulting. By 1999, that
had jumped to 51%." An academic study of the first 563 companies
to file financials after February 5, 2001, found that "on
average, for every dollar of audit fees, clients paid their
independent accountants $2.69 for nonaudit consulting." One
company, Puget Energy, is reported to have paid its auditor,
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, "only $534,000 for its audit, but
over $17 million in consulting fees." Nanette Byrnes, et.
al., The Enron Scandal, Accounting in Crisis, BUSINESS WEEK,
Jan. 28, 2002, p. 44.
The possibility that reliance on income from non-audit functions
might influence the outcome of auditing services exists whenever
the same accountant or accounting firm provides both services
to a company. Restoring investor confidence and assuring investor
protection strongly argues for the separation of non-audit
from audit services.
We recommend that the law be changed to prohibit accounting
firms from providing non-audit services to audit clients.
There may be limited exceptions necessary, for example for
'mom-and-pop' companies, but with few exceptions, the functions
should be separate.
In addition, we recommend that there be mandatory rotation
of audit firms every four years. Rotating audit firms further
assures independence of the audit services and that there
will be a fresh look at a company's books on a regular basis.
Auditors Take Jobs With Companies They Have Just Audited
When Global Crossing filed for bankruptcy amid allegations
of improper accounting, the firm's senior vice president for
finance had been the engagement partner on the audit for Andersen
before joining Global Crossing, according to the Washington
Post. Kirstin Grimsley, Auditors Pushed into "Revolving Door,"
WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 19, 2002.
According to the Washington Post, the senior audit manager
from PricewaterhouseCoopers solicited a job as chief financial
officer of a subsidiary of MicroStrategy while conducting
an audit of MicroStrategy. MicroStrategy later admitted, in
the words of the Washington Post, that "it hadn't made the
profits it reported," and investors lost billions. Accounting
partners now start looking for new jobs in industry when they
reach their forties, according to the Washington Post.
When auditors leave to take jobs with the companies they
have just audited, it erodes investor confidence that the
audit was truly independent, that the auditor did her job
without regard to future employment with the audited company.
We recommend Texas put into place auditor revolving door prohibitions
that would keep responsible members of an audit team from
accepting employment as a financial officer of a company they
have audited.
Conclusion
We support the recommendations made by the Sunset staff
designed to strengthen the Public Accountancy Act. (Support
Recommendations 1.1 -- 1.6, 2.2 -- 2.3, 3.4).
We recommend:
-
changing the makeup of the Board to include majority
public membership.
-
adding whistle-blower protections to the Public Accountancy
Act to protect individuals who report fraudulent accounting
practices.
-
performing additional evaluation of the peer-review system.
-
changing the law to prohibit accounting firms from providing
consulting services to audit clients.
-
requiring mandatory rotation of audit firms every four
years.
-
adding auditor revolving door prohibitions.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments to the
Sunset Commission on the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy.
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