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Minority
Subprime Borrowers |
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This study reinforces (for Texas) the findings of several national studies: race matters. The race/ethnicity of borrowers is a powerful factor in the penetration of subprime lending in Texas communities. Our study shows that subprime loans are concentrated in geographical areas with a higher concentration of minority residents. Even after accounting for other factors, the likelihood of getting a subprime loan increases for minority borrowers, especially Black borrowers. Among higher income borrowers, the distinction between subprime lending to Whites and subprime lending to minorities is stark.
The
Consumers Union study
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This
study analyzes Texas refinance loans from 1997 to 2000. We identify subprime
lending (loans from HUD identified subprime companies) at the state and
city (MSA) level. With 2000 census information about tracts, we identify
patterns of subprime lending using standard regression techniques and cross
tabulations.(1) To compare subprime and prime loans by the race, income and ratio of loan size to income at the MSA level, we combine four years of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data for some of the analysis. This ensures a large enough loan pool for comparison even among smaller subgroups of borrowers. This means that the absolute ratio we calculate for supprime penetration is significantly lower than the 2000 subprime penetration rates calculated by other researchers.(2) |
To gain an understanding of point-of-sale lending practices that might lead large numbers of people into the high priced subprime market, we also reviewed consumer complaints filed with the Office of the Consumer Credit Commissioner and interviewed individual consumers. This information is essentially anecdotal and incorporated here only to suggest possible reasons why so many people take high priced home loans.
Most
vulnerable neighborhoods
In our first report in this series, Consumers Union calculated that residents who refinance their homes using subprime loans pay an estimated average $1,944 per year in additional interest alone.(3) Here we find that the people who most often pay the "subprime premium" live in lower income, high minority neighborhoods with a higher than average share of elderly residents.
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While subprime companies currently control about a third of the refinance loan market statewide, they take a much larger share of refinance loans in some communities. Consumers Union examined 643 Texas census tracts with the highest subprime penetration (over 54 percent subprime), and compared these tracts to tracts with median subprime penetration or less. We found that residents in high subprime tracts were older (more people over 65), had lower incomes and were nearly 80 percent minority. People in these areas can least afford to pay so much more every year for a home secured loan.(4) Minority
borrowers hit hardest This study of HMDA data in
Texas confirms the findings of numerous studies released across the country:
race of the borrower is probably the strongest factor distinguishing loans
with subprime companies. Even
among higher income people, minority borrowers took significantly higher
share of subprime loans We find a large disparity between Black and White borrowers in the subprime arena-and an equally significant disparity between predominantly White and minority neighborhoods-even among higher income people. By 2000, 58.1 percent of Black borrowers took refinance loans from subprime lenders, compared to 39.8 percent of Hispanic borrowers and 23.5 percent of White borrowers.(7) |
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Black and Hispanic families
in Texas statistically earn less and enjoy fewer assets, which can affect credit
scores and loan underwriting. Therefore we analyzed all home purchase and refinance
loans to borrowers earning more than $60,000 annually (1.5 times the state's
median income) and borrowing less than 2.5 times their reported income. We found
that among these higher income people taking a reasonable home refinance loan,
minority borrowers still took refinance loans from subprime companies in almost
the same proportions. While 16.7 percent of upper income Whites refinanced using
a subprime company, 30.9 percent of Hispanics and 46.4 percent of Black borrowers
refinanced through a subprime company statewide.
Clearly the minority concentration of a neighborhood is a factor in the rate
of subprime refinance. Using four years of data to ensure a large number of
minority refinance loans at every minority concentration, Consumers Union plotted
the subprime refinance penetration rate for all upper income borrowers (earning
more than $60,000), and for upper income minority borrowers.(8)
We find that, even for upper income borrowers, use of subprime companies rises
significantly as the minority concentration of the neighborhood rises. Upper
income minority borrowers used subprime companies slightly more often in all
areas.
In a separate analysis, we also looked at upper income Black borrowers living
in predominantly Black areas, and upper income Hispanic borrowers living in
Hispanic areas. These Black borrowers refinancing their homes in predominantly
Black neighborhoods took loans from subprime companies at very high rates, over
40 percent in the most concentrated Black areas. Upper income Hispanic borrowers
also took more refinance loans from subprime companies if they live in predominantly
Hispanic neighborhoods, but the difference is not as sharp.
Race
a powerful factor
Clearly the ethnic composition
of the neighborhood is a factor in subprime penetration. To determine the significance
of the race of the borrower independent of the neighborhood, Consumers Union
predicted the probability that a consumer would end up with a subprime refinance
loan holding constant other factors: the gender of the borrower, the minority
concentration, elderly concentration and income of the neighborhood, borrower
income, loan amount, population density, and the loan to income ratio. Public
data contains no information about the credit history of borrowers.(9)
We find Black borrowers are 3.9 times as likely to end up with a refinance loan
from a subprime company than non-Blacks (combining all other borrowers), after
accounting for all these other factors. We find that Hispanics are 1.6 times
as likely to end up with a refinance loan from a subprime company as non-Hispanics
(combining all other borrowers).
The power of borrower race to predict that the borrower will get a loan from
a subprime company shores up the findings of our recently released studies on
women borrowers and elderly borrowers. We previously reported that women get
loans from subprime companies more than men, but that subprime companies enjoy
their highest penetration rates among Black women borrowers and in high elderly/high
minority neighborhoods.
Race
at the MSA level
In order to look fairly
at all Texas towns and cities, including smaller cities with fewer loans to
selected minority borrowers, Consumers Union reviewed four years of lending
data together. This analysis will present a low actual penetration rate for
subprime lending in these cities, because subprime lending grew throughout the
four year period. Over the four year period, subprime penetration rates average
17 percent, but in 2000 subprime companies made more than a third of refinance
loans.
On the other hand, we can reasonably rank larger and smaller cities together,
with some surprising results. In general, subprime penetration ranks highest
in Texas' medium size cities, and in many of these cities minority borrowers
are far more likely to get subprime loans than White borrowers-with even stronger
disparity ratios than large cities like Houston and Dallas.
Gulf Coast and Rio Grande Valley cities have the highest subprime penetration
in the state over the four year period. Borrowers in Beaumont-Port Arthur, followed
closely by El Paso and McAllen/Edinburg/Mission, took the highest share of subprime
refinance loans.
Compared to White borrowers, Black borrowers in Tyler took far more subprime
refinance loans (45.3 percent compared to 6.5 percent, or a disparity ratio
of 6.99). Black borrowers in Bryan/College Station, San Angelo, and Longview/Marshall
also took a far higher share of loans from subprime companies. Among upper income
Black and White borrowers, the discrepancies were greatest in the state's largest
cities, although this may be partially because there were too few upper income
minority borrowers in most smaller cities for appropriate comparison. The Kileen-Temple
area, a military town with a significant minority population, has the second
largest disparity (after Houston) between subprime lending to Black and White
borrowers.
| Hispanic
borrowers generally took the highest share of subprime loans (compared
to white borrowers) in Lubbock, followed by Bryan/College Station and
Victoria. Higher income Hispanic borrowers took a disproportionate share
of subprime loans in Austin, Houston, and San Antonio compared to upper
income White borrowers. Maps of specific MSAs are perhaps the easiest way to understand the distribution of subprime lending in Texas. This report includes a digital map for review of any Texas MSA. The maps confirm that subprime lenders found a market in the minority, older, and frequently poorer neighborhoods in most Texas cities. |
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Recommendations
Subprime lending can
have disastrous consequences for low income and minority communities. People
who take out home refinance loans they cannot afford face foreclosure if they
don't keep up the payments. People who started out with good credit can lose
their credit if unaffordable payments slip into past due status-even if they
keep paying and don't go all the way to foreclosure.
For many minority communities, home equity is the most important way families
develop wealth over the long term. High cost refinance turns family wealth into
cash, cash that is frequently turned back over to the lender in high loan fees.
To prevent the stripping of equity from the most vulnerable minority families,
the Texas Legislature should reduce the high fees and costs associated with
home refinance. The AARP, the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) and others
have defined loans as "high cost" if they have an interest rate that
equals or exceeds six percentage points over the weekly average yield on five
year treasury bills (currently about 3.5 percent but more typically ranging
from 4 to 6.5 percent over the period of this study). These groups also define
"high cost" as loans that contain fees in excess of three percent
of the loan amount.(10) The Texas Legislature
should set standards for "high cost" loans:
Even borrowers getting
subprime loans where the rate does not exceed six percent above the weekly
5-Year treasury bill rate deserve additional protections to preserve their
home as an asset. Along with AARP and NCLC, we recommend:
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Notes
1 Owner occupied, single family,
refinance home loan records for tracted areas of the state where 2000 census
information is available (402,639 loans). We excluded refinance loans made by
HUD identified manufactured home specialty lenders. In order to factor in more
borrower information and census data, additional records were eliminated for
the regression analysis.
2 Bradford, Calvin, Risk or Race? Racial Disparities and the Subprime Refinance
Market, Center for Community Change, May 2002. This study finds subprime penetration
rates of more than 40 percent in several Texas cities by 2000, and rates of
more than 60 percent among Black borrowers in selected Texas MSAs.
The statistics calculated by Bradford differ from those of Consumers Union because
Bradford calculated the subprime penetration as a share of conventional loans.
Consumers Union calculated loans from subprime companies as a share of all mortgage
lending, including FHA, VA, and FmHA. Since minority borrowers also take a disproportionate
share of FHA and VA loans, the inclusion of these loan types in the base "market"
results in a lower overall estimated penetration of subprime conventional lending
for minority borrowers.
Over all, Consumers Union finds that refinance loans by subprime companies grew
from 6.3 percent of the statewide refinance market in 1997 to 34.8 percent in
2000. The total number of refinance loans made by subprime companies increased
from 2630 loans in 1997 to 23,480 loans in 2000.
3 Women Subprime Borrowers, Consumers Union SWRO, October 2000, p. 2.
4 We split the census tracts that had 2000 census information about age of residents
and minority concentration into quartiles ranked by refinance subprime penetration.
The top quartile of tracts (643 total) had a subprime penetration of 54.54 percent
up to 100 percent of all refinance loans. We calculated the mean minority concentration
and population over 65 for these high subprime penetration tracts, and for the
tracts with subprime penetration at or below the median (the bottom two quartiles,
or 1682 tracts with subprime penetration at or below 40 percent).
5 PCI Services, Inc., "Subprime Refinance Loans as a Ratio of All Refinance
Loans," AARP Public Policy Institute, no date.
6 Bradford, Calvin, "Risk or Race? Racial Disparities and the Subprime
Refinance Market," The Center for Community Change, May 2002, p. 37 and
42.
7 Subprime lenders also now make a considerable number of home purchase loans.
By 2000, 5.1 percent of White borrowers took home purchase loans from subprime
companies, compared to 9.5 percent of Hispanic borrowers and 17.2 percent of
Black borrowers. None of the top twenty purchase mortgage lenders statewide
are subprime companies, but three of the top twenty home purchase lenders to
Black borrowers are subprime.
8 Minority borrowers include Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and those
who identifed as "other." Where fewer than 30 upper income Black or
Hispanic borrowers refinanced their homes over the four year period, we eliminated
the area from the "upper income" analysis.
9 Consumers Union's regression model is based on a logistic regression of 262,329
refinance loans originated in Texas over 1997-2000 as reported under HMDA. The
base of data is smaller because we eliminated all loans where the lender did
not report the race or gender of the borrower, and where income or loan amount
were not reported or reported as zero.
The regression controls for the sex, race and income of the borrower, the size
of the loan, the size of the loan in relation to the income of the borrower,
the presence of a co-applicant, the racial composition and population density
of the home's census tract, as well as the relative wealth of that tract to
the rest of the MSA. The logistic model successfully predicts the outcome 74
percent of the time.
10 American Association of Retired Persons Public Policy Institute, "Home
Loan Protection Act," November 2001.
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