Posted with the permission of National Consumer Law Center, 18 Tremont Street, Boston, MA 02108, 617-523-8010, www.consumerlaw.org. The NCLC publishes a variety of materials on consumer law including the Repossessions and Foreclosures manual (1999 4th ed.).

 

Debt Collection and Repossessions Edition
Volume Eighteen
July/August 1999

Overview of the New Article 9 from a Consumer Perspective: Part 1: The Good News(1)

After several years of development, the new Article 9 was approved by the by the American Law Institute in May 1999 and by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July 1999. The proposed effective date is July 1, 2001. Therefore consumer advocates can expect to see the new Article 9 arriving in their state legislatures shortly.

The purpose of this article is to give an overview of what the new Article 9 does with regard to consumer transactions.

In general, the new Article 9 makes relatively little change in how consumer transactions are treated post-default. There are some modest improvements and some modest reductions in consumer protection. To the few consumer advocates who were involved in the drafting process, the result can perhaps best be characterized as mixed.(2) The end product could have been much better, but it also could have been much worse. Article 9 is part of the Uniform Commercial Code and is particularly important for consumers because it applies to secured transactions including retail and car sales which are financed.

Structure

Generally speaking, the most important aspect of Article 9 for consumer representatives is its rules for what happens when a consumer defaults on a secured transaction. Those provisions, formerly in Part 5, have been moved to Part 6 in the new Article 9.(3) The definitions remain in Part 1. Other provisions of interest to consumer representatives are scattered throughout the new Article 9.(4) The most important will be noted below.

Scope

Perhaps the most noticeable feature of the new Article 9 overall is its expanded scope. Article 9 now applies to the sale of "accounts." This term is broadly defined to include a right to payment of many kinds of monetary obligations, including not only familiar items such as obligations for property that has been or is to be sold or for services rendered, but also exotica such as obligations for lottery winnings or arising from the use of information contained on a credit card.(5) The newly expanded scope of Article 9 will greatly facilitate the securitization of many kinds of commercial transactions.

Fortunately, the expansion movement generally avoided the consumer areas. Various proposals to allow security interests in such things as consumer tort claims and deposit accounts in consumer transactions were rejected.(6) From the consumer perspective, the scope of new Article 9 should be similar to the scope of the old.

· First, the good news . . .

 

The new Article 9 has some modest improvements for consumers. These include:

 

· Incorporation of the FTC Holder in Due Course Rule

There has been a lingering debate over whether a commercial assignee who takes assignment of a consumer contract lacking the FTC "abrogation of holder in due course" notice(7) should be held to the notice's requirements anyway. The New Article 9 answers that question in the affirmative.

If a consumer enters into a contract that should have contained the notice required by Federal Trade Commission Rule 433 that any assignee would take the contract subject to the consumer's claims and defenses against the original holder, but the contract did not contain it, then the new Article 9 will impose the same liability on the assignee as would have been imposed if the notice had been present.(8) The Official Comments observe that "[New 9-403(d)] effectively renders waiver-of-defense clauses ineffective in the consumer transactions to which it applies."(9)

· Limited protection against multiple demands for payment.

The new Article 9 provides that a consumer whose account is assigned may continue to make payments to the assignor until receiving a notification, authenticated by the assignor or assignee, that assignment has been made and that payment should now be made to the assignee.(10) After such notification, the consumer must start paying the assignee, and may not reduce his or her debt by paying the assignor.(11) Standards are set forth for effective notice.(12) The debtor may request reasonable proof of the assignment, and may keep paying the assignor until proof is furnished.(13) This provision is made subject to other law establishing different rules for consumer debtors.(14)
[3n] Improvement of notice of sale

The new Article 9 requires more detailed information to be given to a consumer before disposition of collateral. New [ss]9-614(a)(1) requires the following information to be given:

(1) A description of the debtor and the secured party;

(2) A description of the collateral that is the subject of the intended disposition;

(3) The method of intended disposition;

(4) A statement that the debtor is entitled to an accounting of the unpaid indebtedness, and any charge for such an accounting;

(5) The time and place of any public sale or the time after which any other disposition is to be made;

(6) A description of any liability for a deficiency of the person to whom the notice is sent;

(7) A phone number from which the amount needed to redeem the collateral can be obtained;

(8) A phone number or mailing address from which additional information about the disposition and the obligation can be obtained.(15)

Inclusion of the above information is mandatory. The comments note that "[a] notification that lacks any of the information in subsection (a)(1) is insufficient as a matter of law."(16)

A "safe harbor" notice form is given in New [ss]9-614(a)(3). It is relatively "plain language," and explains not only the conditions of the sale but also what happens after the sale.

An error in completing the "safe harbor" notice, if not involving one of the eight mandatory requirements given above, will not make the notice insufficient unless the error "is misleading with respect to rights arising under this article."(17) The comments characterize such harmless errors as "non-misleading, minor errors in information . . . not required under subsection (a)(1)." (18) If a creditor elects not to use the "safe harbor" notice, however, then the new Article 9 leaves it up to "other law" to decide the effect of including information not required by subsection (a)(1).(19) Advocates should note that inaccuracies which do not create Article 9 liability could still create liability under other laws (e.g., UDAP statutes).
[3n] Low price dispositions to insiders

Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of Article 9 from a consumer perspective has been the inability of the "commercially reasonable" standard to consistently produce resales at prices high enough to significantly reduce deficiencies.

No overall solution to this problem will be found in the new Article 9. The "commercially reasonable" standard remains firmly in place.(20)

However, the new Article 9 does make an improvement for one subset of low-price resales --- the ones in which the collateral is bought by the secured party itself, by a person related to the secured party,(21) or by a secondary obligor.(22)

The drafters of the new Article 9 recognized that "when the foreclosing secured party or a related party is the transferee of the collateral [at a foreclosure sale or disposition], the secured party sometimes lacks the incentive to maximize the proceeds of disposition."(23)

They therefore provided that if the collateral is bought by the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor, and "the amount of proceeds is significantly below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition to [someone else] would have brought,"(24) then the surplus or deficiency should be calculated "based on the amount of proceeds that would have been realized in a [complying] disposition to [someone else]."(25) In other words, the debtor should be credited with what a true arms-length sale should have produced, rather than what the low-price insider sale did in fact produce.

Is this change a benefit for consumer debtors? The answer depends on the current law of your state. If you live in a state where courts have already held (or statutes already provide) that price is a term which must be commercially reasonable in all dispositions, then the new [ss]9-615(f) is a step backward. As the comments note, [New 9-615(f)] ". . . rejects the view that the secured party's receipt of [a significantly lower than normal] price necessarily constitutes noncompliance with Part 6."(26) But if you live in a state which does not now require the price to be a commercially reasonable term in all dispositions (most states fit into this category), then the new [ss]9-615(f) gives you a new way to attack low-price resales, at least when the resale was to the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor.

· New notice of calculation of deficiency.

New [ss]9-616 will require the secured party to send an "explanation" to the consumer, post-resale, of how much the surplus or deficiency is and how it was calculated.

The explanation must be sent (1) before or when the secured party first makes written demand on the consumer obligor for payment of the deficiency (or accounts for and pays any surplus), and (2) within 14 days after the secured party receives a request.(27)

The explanation must include:

(1) how much the secured obligations were, as of a given date no more than 35 days before the secured party repossessed the collateral (or before the disposition if the secured party did not repossess or took possession of the collateral before default);

(2) the proceeds of the disposition;

(3) how much of the secured obligations are left after deducting the proceeds;

(4) what the expenses were;

(5) what the credits were (including interest rebates); and

(6) how much the surplus or deficiency is.(28)

An explanation that substantially complies with these requirements is sufficient, even if the explanation contains "minor errors that are not seriously misleading."(29) The debtor or consumer obligor is entitled to one free explanation during any six-month period in which the secured party did not already send one under [ss]9-616(b)(1); otherwise, the secured party can charge up to $25.(30)

The consumer's damages under [ss]9-616 are limited. A secured party that fails to send an explanation within 14 days of the debtor's request is liable for any loss caused plus $500 per violation.(31) @ A secured party that fails to send an explanation before or when first making a written demand for payment of a deficiency (or accounting for a surplus) is liable for any loss caused, plus, if the noncompliance was part of a pattern, or consistent with a pattern of noncompliance, $500.(32) But the non-complying secured party will not be liable for statutory minimum damages under new [ss]9-625(c)(2).(33)

Advocates should note that there may be a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act(34) for collection efforts that include a written demand if the demand does not contain, or is not preceded by, an explanation. Since New [ss]9-616(b) requires the notice to be sent before or with the first written effort to collect, the creditor arguably has no right to collect the debt before the explanation has been properly sent.
[3n] Waivers generally prohibited

In general, the provisions of Part 6 which give rights to consumer debtors and obligors and impose duties on secured parties cannot be waived or varied.(35)
[3n] States with the absolute-bar rule can keep it for consumers.

This is not so much an improvement as an avoidance of deterioration, but as a consumer-positive provision it deserves to be mentioned.

States have differed in the approach they have taken to the effect of an Article 9 violation on the creditor's ability to collect a deficiency. Some states have held that such violations create an "absolute bar" to collection of the deficiency. Other states have held that such violations create only a "rebuttable presumption" that a complying Article 9 disposition would have yielded an amount sufficient to eliminate the deficiency, leaving it open for creditors to prove otherwise. Old Article 9 was silent on the issue.

New Article 9 adopts the "rebuttable presumption" rule for non-consumer transactions.(36) However, consumer transactions are explicitly excluded from this approach, and "the proper rule in consumer transactions" is left "to the court."(37) The statute also instructs the court not to infer from the exclusion of consumer transactions "the nature of the proper rule in consumer transactions" and allows the court to "continue to apply established approaches."(38)

The effect of this interesting compromise should be to allow states which now have the absolute-bar rule to keep it in consumer transactions.(39)

[3n]Expanded definition of "Good Faith"
The new Article 9 adds to the previous definition of good faith. Formerly Article 9 looked to the Article 1 definition of good faith, which was honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.(40) Now Article 9 has its own definition: honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.(41) This is identical to the definition of good faith contained in the proposed new Article 2, and seems to reflect an acknowledgement that to act in good faith requires not only honesty, but in some degree, fairness as well.(42) How much the new definition will be of any practical benefit to consumers remains to be seen.

Debt Collection and Repossessions Edition
Volume Seventeen
Sept/Oct 1999

[1n]Overview of the New Article 9 from a Consumer Perspective: Part 2: The Bad News (continued from the last issue)

[2n]Now, the bad news...

[3n]Constructive strict foreclosure eliminated?

Under Old Article 9, it had been possible to argue that extensive delay by a secured party in disposing of collateral constituted a "constructive" strict foreclosure, in full satisfaction of the debtor's outstanding obligation. This argument will no longer be available under new Article 9 if a court follows the new commentary. "A purported or apparent acceptance of collateral under [New section 9-620] is ineffective unless (1) the secured party consents to the acceptance in an authenticated record or sends a proposal to the debtor; and (2) [various other conditions are met]."(43) The comments add: "[A] mere delay in collection or disposition of collateral does not constitute a "constructive" strict foreclosure. Instead, a delay that is unreasonable may be a factor relating to whether the secured party acted in a commercially reasonable manner"(44)

· Simultaneous exercise of creditor remedies authorized.

Under Old section 9-501(1), the secured party's remedies were cumulative, but it was unclear whether they could be exercised simultaneously. It is no longer unclear. The creditor's remedies now "are cumulative and may be exercised simultaneously."(45) The comments note that the secured party must act in good faith, and that New section 9-601(c) does not override non-UCC law, including tort law and debt-collection statutes, which could make a creditor liable for abusive behavior or harassment.(46)

· Fee for second accounting raised to $25

Under Old section 9-208(3), the debtor could obtain a statement of account or list of collateral once every six months without charge, but the creditor could charge $10 for each additional statement provided within that period. Under New section 9-210(f), the fee for an additional statement has been raised to $25.

· Little protection for business purpose loans secured by consumer purpose collateral

In the new Article 9, the applicability of consumer protection rules is largely governed by whether a party or transaction falls within one of several consumer-related definitions.(47) Two of these definitions, those of "consumer-goods transaction" and "consumer transaction," have multiple requirements, all of which must be met. A transaction is a "consumer-goods transaction" if the obligation is secured by a security interest in consumer goods bought primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and if an individual incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.(48) A transaction is a "consumer transaction if an individual incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, a security interest secures the obligation, and the collateral is held or acquired primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.(49)

The effect of these requirements is that if collateral was originally purchased for a "consumer" purpose, but is later used by the consumer to secure a business purpose loan, the collateral loses its "consumer" status and the limited protections that go with such status. Consumer advocates are concerned that people who think of themselves as consumers and make purchases as consumers will, by later using those purchases to secure business loans, be unwittingly putting themselves into a different, and less protected, category.

· Transfer of collateral to one who has a repurchase agreement is no longer clearly not an Article 9 sale

Under Old section 9-504(5), a person who "is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, endorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and who receives a transfer of collateral from the secured party or is subrogated to his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the secured party. Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the collateral under this article." Thus, under old Article 9, if Joe's Autos repurchases the car it sold to Consumer after Bob's Finance repossessed it, the repurchase by Joe's would not be the Article 9 sale. Rather, the subsequent sale of the car by Joe's would be the Article 9 sale.

Under New section 9-618, this flat rule is eliminated. A more limited version is substituted which would allow the possibility of a secured party transferring collateral to a secondary obligor in a transaction that would be a disposition and would establish a deficiency or surplus. Only if the secondary obligor agrees to accept the right and assume the duties of the secured party, as well as take the transfer of collateral, will the transfer be defined by statute as clearly not an Article 9 disposition.(50)

· Coming Soon to a Legislature Near You . . .

The new Article 9, generally speaking, does not significantly cut back on existing consumer protection. Several provisions in Article 9 establish different rules for commercial and consumer transactions. These differences generally reflect more favorable or "friendly" treatment for consumers.

Even though the new Article 9 may seem like more or less a "wash" for consumers, and therefore not of great importance, remember that your state's final version doesn't have to be that way. Once Article 9 reaches the state legislatures, there are no guarantees that its limited consumer protection provisions will survive. Although the drive for uniformity in UCC matters is strong, sometimes state legislators have different views. Sometimes industries decide to seek at the state level what they could not get at the national level.

Therefore consumer advocates should keep a close eye on the progress of the new Article 9 through their state legislatures. If certain key sections are changed, the results could be much worse for consumers.

Here are the key sections to watch:

[b] New section 9-109(d)(12) excludes the assignment of non-commercial tort claims from the coverage of Article 9. This is important because if personal injury and other personal tort claims could be assigned through an Article 9 security interest, they would quickly become part of the boilerplate.

[b] New section 9-109(d)(13) excludes the assignment of a deposit account in a consumer transaction from the
coverage of Article 9. This is important for the same reason as the previous provision.

[b] New section 9-201(b) provides that any applicable rule of law which establishes a different rule for consumers also applies to any transaction which is subject to Article 9, and New section 9-201(c) adds that in case of a conflict between Article 9 and the separate consumer rule, the separate consumer rule controls. This ensures that states which take a more aggressive approach to consumer protection will not be inhibited by Article 9.

[b] New sections 9-403 and 9-404 hold assignees liable for claims and defenses the consumer would have against the original holder, even if the FTC Holder in Due Course notice is omitted.(51)

[b] New section 9-406 protects consumers to some extent against multiple demands for payment by assignors and assignees, and also against demands for split payments.

[b] New section 9-614 improves the content and form of notice to consumers before disposition of collateral.

[b] New section 9-615(f) provides that if a disposition is made to an affiliated party (the secured party itself, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor), and if the proceeds are significantly below those which a disposition to a non-affiliated party would have brought, the consumer should be credited with the amount the disposition to a non-affiliated party would have brought.

[b] New section 9-616 requires explanation of the calculation of deficiency.

[b] New section 9-620(g) allows partial strict foreclosure, but makes an exception for consumer transactions. This exception protects consumers with valuable collateral against being pressured or led into turning over the collateral in exchange for only partial satisfaction of the debt.

[b] New section 9-625 generally preserves the availability of statutory damages to consumers.

[b] New section 9-626(a) provides that in non-consumer transactions, the rebuttable presumption rule is adopted, but in consumer transactions, New section 9-626(b) leaves it to the courts to determine the proper rule. Advocates should watch for attempts in their states to expand section 9-626(a) to cover consumer transactions.

[b] Many sections of new Article 9 mention "consumer obligors" as well as consumer debtors. If any cross- reference to consumer obligors is removed, consumer guarantors or co-signers could lose some of the protection they have under current law.

Conclusion

The new Article 9, if adopted as written, should have relatively little impact either way on defaulting consumers. But changes at the state level could easily turn it into a disaster.

So those who wish to protect the interests of consumers should keep a close eye on the new Article 9 as it moves through their state legislatures, to make sure no effort is made to weaken its consumer-protection provisions. If such changes are proposed, remember: there are all kinds of interesting ways Article 9 could be improved from a consumer perspective, too.

Notes:

________

(1) Thanks to Michael Ferry with Gateway Legal Services in Saint Louis, Mo. for this article. Mike thanks Gail Hillebrand of Consumers Union and David McMahon of Mountain View Legal Services for providing information for this article. All opinions expressed and errors contained herein are Mike's and the editor's.

(2) Consumer advocates active in the Article 9 process included Gail Hillebrand of Consumers Union (whose efforts to gain ground for consumers and prevent them from losing ground deserve far more recognition than they will ever receive), David McMahon of Mountain View Legal Services, private attorney Yvonne Rosmarin (formerly with the National Consumer Law Center), and myself. In addition, law professors who were active in the process as observers and who frequently advocated for increased consumer protection included Michael Greenfield of Washington University in St. Louis and Norm Silber of Hofstra University. "Mixed" is my characterization, not theirs.

(3) See generally, New sectionsection 9-601 through 9-628. All citations herein prefaced with the word "New" are to the provisions of the Revision of Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 - Secured Transactions, with Prefatory Note and Reporter's Notes, as approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July 1998, Copyright 1998 by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. All citations herein prefaced with the word "Old" are to the previous version of Article 9, commonly known as the 1972 version.

(4) New section 9-109(a)(3).

(5) New section 9-102(a)(2).

(6) See generally New section 9-109(d).

(7) 16 C.F.R. section 433. See National Consumer Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices section 6.6 (4th ed. 1997 and Supp.).

(8) New section 9-403(d); New section 9-404(d).

(9) New section 9-403, Comment 5.

(10) New section 9-406(a).

(11) Id.

(12) New section 9-406(b).

(13) New section 9-406(c).

(14) New section 9-406(g).

(15) New section 9-614(a)(1); see also New section 9-613(a)(1).

(16) New section 9-614, Comment 2. This varies from the rule in commercial transactions, in which the trier of fact may find a notice sufficient even if it lacks some of the required information. See New section 9-613(2).

(17) New section 9-614(a)(4).

(18) New section 9-614, Comment 3 (emphasis in original).

(19) New section 9-614(b); see also New section 9-614, Comment 3.

(20) New section 9-610(b).

(21) New sections 9-102(a)(62) and (63).

(22) See New section 9-102, Comment 2(a).

(23) New section 9-615, Comment 6.

(24) New 9-615(f)(2).

(25) New section 9-615(f).

(26) New section 9-615, Comment 6. The Reporters add that "such a price may suggest the need for greater judicial scrutiny." See also New section 9-610, Comment 9: "A low price may suggest that a court should scrutinize carefully all aspects of a disposition, including the method manner, time, place, and other terms, to ensure that each aspect was commercially reasonable."

(27) New section 9-616(b).

(28) New section 9-616(c).

(29) New section 9-616(d).

(30) New section 9-616(e).

(31) New section 9-625(b), (c), and (e)(7). See also New section 9-616, Comment 3.

(32) New section 9-625(b), (c), and (e)(6). See also New section 9-616, Comment 3.

(33) New section 9-628(d). The statutory minimum damages referred to are the familiar time price differential plus 10% of the cash price or the credit service charge plus 10% of the principal amount of the obligation from Old section 9-507.

(34) E.g., 15 U.S.C. section 1692e(2)(A).

(35) New section 9-602.

(36) New section 9-626(a).

(37) New section 9-626(b).

(38) Id.

(39) Query: Does New section 626(b) also invite courts in "rebuttable presumption" states to reconsider the "nature of the proper rule" in consumer transactions?

(40) Old section 1-201(19).

(41) New section 9-102(43).

(42) See New section 2-102(a)(23), 1999 Annual Meeting Draft, Proposed Revisions of Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 B Sales.

(43) New section 9-620(b).

(44) New section 9-620, Comment 5.

(45) New section 9-601(c).

(46) New section 9-601, Comment 4.

(47) See generally New section 9-102(a)(22) (consumer debtor), (23) (consumer goods), (24) (consumer-goods transaction), (25) (consumer obligor), and (26) (consumer transaction).

(48) New section 9-102(a)(24). The comments clarify that even if some of the collateral was acquired for a business purpose, the transaction is still a consumer-goods transaction. See New section 9-102, Comment 7.

(49) New section 9-102(a)(26).

(50) New section 9-618(a)(2), (b)(1). An assignment or subrogation will also not constitute a disposition of collateral under Article 9. See New section 9-618(a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(1).

(51) See Section 3.A., supra.

 


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