HEARING BEFORE THE
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES
Docket No. R-1075
SAN FRANCISCO, SEPTEMBER 7, 2000
On behalf of Consumers Union
(1)
, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to address the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors. We commend the Federal Reserve
for its leadership in examining more closely the phenomenon of
predatory lending practices in the home equity market and their
deleterious effect on the American public. It is our hope that these
hearings will result in the Board using its rulemaking authority to
curb predatory home equity lending practices that have stripped the
homes and equity from countless Americans.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumers Union has studied the problem of
predatory lending and included our findings in two reports: Dirty
Deeds: Abuses and Fraudulent Practices in California's Home Equity
Market (1995), and The Hard Sell-Combating Home Equity Lending Fraud
in California (1998). We have also examined the potential for the
financial abuse of senior citizens with another equity-based mortgage
product, the reverse mortgage, and have published our findings in a
1999 report entitled, There's No Place Like Home, The Implications of
Reverse Mortgages on Seniors in California.
In our examination of predatory lending, we
found that the practice of intentionally making equity-based loans on
impossible terms is not new and is not unique to California. In
1998, Consumers Union found that in California, the estimated losses
due to home equity lending fraud and overpriced, unfairly induced
loans ran at least into the tens of millions of dollars and very
possibly hundreds of millions. The victims are mostly elderly,
minority and low-income residents who have owned their homes for many
years. Although many of the victims have few cash assets, they have
built tremendous equity through decades of hard-earned mortgage
payments and appreciating real estate values. This has made these
individuals prime targets for predatory lenders.
In our reports, we cite many cases where
lenders aggressively sought out unsuspecting borrowers for equity
loans with interest rates as high as 30%, and fees of 20 or more
points. Many loans cited in our reports had terms that are clearly
stacked against the borrower, such as, mandatory arbitration clauses,
balloon payment provisions, and stiff pre-payment penalties, to name
a few.
Several of the cases cited involved violations
of existing lending laws and regulations. However, the sad reality
is that while many of the practices complained about by the borrowers
are unfair, abusive and even immoral, many of them are not
illegal.
There are many subprime lenders who defend the
practice of charging high interest rates and fees by saying that they
are performing a community service by lending to those without other
borrowing options. Indeed, there may be those for whom they are
providing necessary financial services who have been denied a
mortgage from a conventional source. However, there is another
segment of the subprime industry, the predatory lenders, who
aggressively cast a wide net to ensnare any potential borrower into
an expensive mortgage. This pool of potential borrowers can include
those not looking for a loan in the first place, those not savvy
enough to know that they could qualify for a better priced loan on
better terms, or those who succumb to hard sell tactics and find
themselves in financially impossible loans that may cost them their
homes.
Until regulators and legislators enact serious
protections against predatory lending, particularly against those
practices which are not technically illegal, predatory lending will
continue to flourish. Because of California's soaring real estate
values and the high percentage of California's home equity held by
senior citizens, fully 72.5% of the state's seniors are homeowners,
our senior population will continue to be heavily targeted by
predatory lenders. Seniors who live on fixed incomes, or in minority
or low-income communities abandoned by conventional lending
institutions, are at increased risk as their diminished borrowing
options make them ripe prey for predatory lenders.
Consumers Union firmly believes that a
multi-prong approach is necessary to stem the tide of home equity
lending fraud and abuse. Certainly, the public needs to be active in
protecting itself from the pitfalls of predatory lending.
Additionally, the federal government must act to ensure that it is
not the public policy of this nation to allow any business to engage
in practices that result in unsuspecting borrowers losing their homes
to impossible loans. Today presents an opportunity for this Board to
create new protections and to strengthen existing protections for
America's mortgage borrowers.
II. THE CREATION OF HOEPA
Finding an absence of state controls against
abusive loans and laws that allow interest rates of up to 60% per
year, Congress took action in 1994 in a bipartisan effort to provide
some relief. The result was the federal Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994, which places special provisions on
"high-rate, high-fee mortgages. High rate, high fee mortgages are
defined in the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act as loans with
interest rates 10 percentage points above comparable terms for U.S.
Treasury securities with similar maturities,
(2)
or a loan for which the consumer pays total points and fees exceeding
the greater of $400 or eight percent of the total loan amount
(including all costs and compensation for brokers). The provisions
require creditors to provide disclosures at least three days before
the loan is closed to borrowers whose loans are subject to the Act,
in addition to those required by TILA. Transactions covered by HOEPA
are subject to certain substantive limitations that prohibit certain
terms from being included in the loan contract.
III. FEDERAL RESERVE REGULATORY AUTHORITY
UNDER HOEPA
HOEPA requires that the Federal Reserve Board
(hereinafter "the Board") conduct public hearings to determine the
adequacy of federal law in protecting consumers, particularly
low-income consumers. HOEPA authorizes the Board to adjust HOEPA's
high-cost triggers, and to prohibit certain acts and practices in
connection with mortgage loans if the Board makes the findings
required by the statute.
IV. SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE
BOARD COULD EXERCISE ITS REGULATORY AUTHORITY UNDER HOEPA TO ADDRESS
CONCERNS ABOUT PREDATORY LENDING
While some individuals use the absence of a
single precise definition as an excuse to stall any meaningful
legislative reform, there is ample evidence that predatory lending
practices continue to flourish. When HOEPA was instituted, the door
was left open to determine if any weaknesses in its provisions
continued to allow the very practices it was meant to prevent. Some
argue that enforcing existing laws is all that is needed. Consumers
Union believes that the answer is not that simple. Certainly,
existing laws need to be enforced. Additionally, however, the
Federal Reserve Board and others must act to close the loopholes in
existing laws that circumvent the intent of HOEPA.
A. Adjusting the HOEPA Triggers
Lowering the trigger and including certain
costs within the points and fees calculation is the best way to
further the protections of HOEPA. This allows HOEPA's protections to
be extended to a broader class of transactions and guards against the
possibility that a creditor will attempt to evade HOEPA by recouping
higher costs associated with a loan by charging more fees/services
that are not included in the HOEPA trigger calculations.
1. APR Trigger
HOEPA authorizes the Board to adjust the HOEPA
trigger by 2 percentage points from the current standard of 10
percentage points above the U.S. Treasury securities with comparable
maturities. Consumers Union believes that lowering the APR trigger
to 8 percentage points would be effective in furthering the purposes
of HOEPA. By lowering the APR trigger, more loans will be subject
to HOEPA's disclosures and restrictions thereby extending HOEPA
protections to a broader class of loans. HOEPA was enacted to
protect.
Lowering the APR trigger may have some impact
on the availability and/or cost of subprime mortgage loans. However,
judging by the increase of entrants into the subprime market after
the enactment of HOEPA, one could conclude that the size of the
subprime market will continue to attract interested lenders, even if
greater protections for consumers are enacted.
2. Points and Fees Trigger
HOEPA protections are triggered if the points
and fees paid by the consumer exceed the greater of 8 percent of the
loan amount or $400. "Points and fees" include all items included in
the finance charge and APR except interest, and all compensation paid
to mortgage brokers. HOEPA specifically excludes from the "points
and fees" provision reasonable closing costs that are paid to an
unaffiliated third party.
Consumers Union recommends that the Federal
Reserve Board should use its authority under HOEPA to add additional
fees to the calculation that triggers HOEPA protections. Lenders
will often add additional products or restrictions that drive-up the
cost of the loan but are not included in the current definition of
"points and fees" and therefore do not trigger HOEPA protections.
These fees can include optional but aggressively marketed credit life
insurance, and prepayment penalties which, when triggered, may
significantly increase the cost of a loan.
a. Credit Insurance
With respect to credit insurance, mandatory
credit insurance premiums are considered to be finance charges that
are applicable to both the APR and points and fees triggers.
However, optional credit life insurance premiums are not included in
the points and fees test but should be. The current HOEPA
distinction turns on whether these products are mandatory or
optional. An alternative way of looking at credit insurance, and
perhaps a more appropriate approach given the objectives of HOEPA, is
to look at what all forms of credit insurance fail to offer the
consumer, and the incentive for lenders to push credit insurance
because, 1) the high profit margins these products generate, and 2)
the exclusion of optional credit life insurance premiums from cost
assessments for HOEPA protections.
Credit insurance is a bad deal for consumers.
In March 1999, Consumers Union and the Center for Economic Justice
issued a report entitled, Credit Insurance: The $2 Billion a Year
Rip-Off-Ineffective Regulation Fails to Protect Consumers. We
reported that from 1995 to 1997, more than $17 billion of credit
insurance was sold in the United States. We estimated that credit
insurance consumers were overcharged by over 35 percent of the
amounts they pay and determined this fact by looking at credit
insurance loss ratios. We reported that the credit insurance
industry had a loss ratio equal to 40 percent for credit life and
credit disability insurance in the 1995 to 1997 period, compared to
the 60 percent recommended by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC). Most states have failed to protect consumers
from the implications of these low loss ratios and we concluded that
as a result of ineffective regulation, consumers overpay for credit
insurance by $2 billion dollars a year.
The target market for credit insurance is
typically lower-income consumers. Because low-income consumers are
most in need of the underlying loan, these consumers are most
vulnerable to coercive sales tactics for credit insurance. In our
opinion, the tremendous profit to producers from the sale of credit
insurance has led to numerous instances of unfair and deceptive sales
practices by credit insurers and producers over the years. Our
report cites just three major examples from the past few years. Some
of these tactics include tricking consumers into the purchase of
credit insurance, high pressure sales tactics, shuffling the papers
to produce two versions of the same document, the copy to the
consumer omitting important documentation of the transaction, failure
to disclose that the consumers signature resulted in signing up for
credit insurance, and misleading consumers into believing that credit
insurance is required for loan approval.
The effect of including lump-sum premiums
collected at closing for optional credit insurance, from the
consumers perspective, is the same as collecting the lump-sum premium
at closing for mandatory credit insurance--it costs the consumer
money. The consumer must pay additional fees to finance overpriced,
often unnecessary credit insurance in addition to the fees to finance
the loan. By treating optional credit insurance the same as
mandatory credit insurance, for the reasons stated above, consumers
who succumb to overpriced credit insurance sales practices, albeit
"voluntarily," will be afforded the same protections under HOEPA as
those who are told that such insurance is necessary to obtain a loan.
This change in HOEPA would help further the purposes of the Act to
protect consumers from abuses of packing "optional" credit insurance
into loans for the purposes of increasing profits and evading HOEPA's
provisions.
b. Prepayment Penalties
There have been many reports of "churning" by
lenders, the practice of multiple refinances of a loan within a short
period of time. The result for consumers has been that with each
refinance, the consumer must pay additional points and fees
associated with the loan, and in many cases prepayment penalties.
With equity based borrowing, the result has been a stripping of
consumers' equity with each refinance. In some cases, multiple
refinancing has resulted in consumers losing all of their equity to
the lender.
To discourage this problem, the Federal Reserve
Board can use its authority to broaden the class of points and fees
that would trigger HOEPA protections.
The Board can include prepayment penalties
(assessed on the original loan) in HOEPA's points and fees test for
the new loan when the loan is refinanced with the same creditor (or
an affiliate).
Prepayment penalty provisions have been used by
creditors to lock unsuspecting borrowers into costly, unfavorable
loans. Prepayment penalties, by their very nature, reduce the value
of the loan to the borrower by the cost that the borrower must pay to
satisfy the penalty upon refinance with the existing or any other
creditor. Clearly, the existence of a prepayment penalty should be
assessed into the points and fees test under any circumstance as a
"cost" associated with the loan. That some prime lenders allow
borrowers to "buy out" of a prepayment penalty by paying a higher
interest rate or additional points underscores the cost factor of
prepayment penalties.
It follows, then, that when the same creditor
or an affiliate of the creditor that first imposed the prepayment
penalty refinances an existing loan, the cost of the prepayment
penalty borne by the consumer should rightfully be subject to HOEPA's
points and fees test to further the intent of the Act. This would
curb abuses by lenders who include prepayment penalty provisions to
lock consumers into unfavorable terms only to use the borrower's
desperation as the basis for generating income, and in some cases,
stripping equity through multiple refinancing.
c. Points
The Board could add any points paid by the
consumer for the existing loan to the points and fees test when the
same creditor (or an affiliate) refinances the loan within a
specified time period for the same reasons as outlined in the
prepayment penalties section above.
B. Restricting Certain Acts or Practices
under HOEPA
Credit Insurance
Consumers Union is aware that the Board has
previously recommended to Congress that it consider prohibiting the
advance collection of premiums for credit insurance policies in
connection with HOEPA loans. We support this recommendation.
However, if no statutory prohibition is
adopted, we believe the Board should regulate the conditions under
which such policies are sold or financed.
The single, most effective measure the Board
could take is to enact regulations that prohibit lenders from
requiring a borrower to purchase credit insurance as a precursor to
obtaining a mortgage. The Board should prohibit sales of prepaid
single-premium credit life policies in connection with the
origination of the mortgage, regardless of whether the premium is
financed in the mortgage amount or paid from the borrower's funds.
This provision can be strengthened by imposing an additional
restriction to not sell credit insurance for 30 days until after a
loan has closed.
Disclosures can be useful for informing
consumers about important information. They are, however, not as
effective for implementing the intention of HOEPA, as the measures
outlined in the paragraph above, which prevent the business practices
that lead to abuses. As outlined above, should the consumer decide
that he or she wants credit insurance, it will still be available at
a time when the consumer can decide independently of the original
loan transaction whether such insurance will be beneficial.
Requiring a notification to the consumer after the loan closing of
their right to cancel a policy and obtain a refund is not as
beneficial to the consumer as separating the two transactions and
allowing the consumer to decide after the fact if credit insurance is
necessary. After the fact "notices" still leave the door wide open
for abuses on the front end, and require the consumer to act
proactively to remedy the abuse. It is our opinion that the abuses
must be prohibited in the first place.
Unaffordable Loans
Consumers Union is aware that under HOEPA, a
creditor may not engage in a pattern or practice of extending credit
based on the collateral if (given the consumer's current and expected
income, current obligations, and employment status) the consumer will
be unable to make scheduled loan payments.
It might be helpful to provide additional
interpretive guidelines on the "pattern or practice" requirement,
such as, "loans subject to HOEPA may not be consummated if payments
on all existing debt exceed 40% of the borrower's total income and
should be void if miscalculations or misstatements are made by the
loan officer so the contract can appear to meet this condition."
Exceeding a certain debt-to-income guideline helps establish a
minimum standard for affordability and should be considered in light
of other circumstances on a case-by-case basis to determine if a
lender is extending credit based on a borrower's collateral and not
on the borrower's ability to repay, as required by HOEPA.
Refinancing Lower-Rate Loans
It is appropriate for the Board to institute
regulatory action to protect consumers from refinancing abuses where
lower cost debt (many times unsecured) is refinanced and converted
into higher cost, home-secured debt. We have seen many instances
where lenders require borrowers to consolidate in order to refinance
and in many cases, this consolidation includes previously unsecured
debt and lower interest rate home-secured debt, such as special loans
made by cities to finance home improvements for low-income
seniors.
The Board can require that for loans that
include refinancing of debt, the lender must demonstrate that the
refinancing will result in lower overall costs for a borrower and add
real economic benefit for the borrower. For example, a borrower
should realize an appreciable effect on the mortgage interest rate,
terms or payments in exchange for incurring new fees for the
refinancing. Absent such a showing, refinancing of lower-rate loans
should be prohibited.
Balloon Payments
Consumers Union is aware that HOEPA currently
prohibits balloon payments for high-cost loans that have terms of
less than 5 years. We are also aware of the practice of some lenders
that price their loans just under HOEPA's triggers in order to sell
balloon payment loans not subject to HOEPA restrictions. Loans based
on balloon payments-a large, final payment at the termination of the
loan came into common use in the late 1970s and early 1980s when high
interest rates made home buying unaffordable for many Americans. The
purpose was to give homeowners an opportunity for lower payments
through what became known as "creative financing."
Although balloon payment loans may have
provided an entry into the home ownership market, today, unscrupulous
lenders use balloon payments to convince naïve borrowers they
will receive funds for a lower monthly payment, knowing the borrower
will eventually not be able to make the balloon payment. When the
balloon come due, these lenders foreclose on the house or arrange for
a new loan at even higher rates and fees. With each subsequent
refinance, the lender consumes more of the borrowers equity in the
form of fees and higher interest rates.
For all balloon payment loans, whether or not
covered by HOEPA, the Board should prohibit balloon payments on home
equity based loans unless the borrower has the option to fully
amortize the payment at the end of the initial loan term.
The Board should prohibit "payable on demand"
clauses in HOEPA loans unless such a clause is exercised in
connection with a consumer default. Absent a consumer default, the
clause acts as a balloon payment provision. When such a clause is
contained in a HOEPA loan, all of the restrictions that apply to
balloon payments in HOEPA loans should apply.
Misrepresentations Regarding Borrower's
Qualifications
Consumers would benefit greatly if the Board
issued a rule that prohibits creditors or brokers from providing
false or materially misleading information about a borrower's
creditworthiness. This would protect consumers against creditors or
brokers who use inaccurate information to mislead borrowers into
thinking that they might not qualify for better or cheaper credit
elsewhere. Indeed, many borrowers have obtained high-cost loans
believing that they could not have qualified for a better loan, or
believing that this was the only way to meet their financial
needs.
We believe that the Board should require that
lenders or brokers offer loans of the highest grade possible for a
given consumer. This includes not steering creditworthy borrowers to
higher priced products when an applicant qualifies for a lower-cost
standard mortgage product. Adding a provision requiring a
subprime-only lender to offer a prime rate for a borrower who would
qualify could strengthen this guideline. If a subprime-only lender
cannot offer such a product, it should be required to refer the
borrower to a prime lender who could.
Reporting Borrowers Payment History
The Board should require creditors to report a
borrower's positive payment history promptly and regularly to all of
the national credit reporting bureaus. Positive payment history
helps borrowers restore blemished credit records which allows them
more borrowing options on better terms. Lenders should be prohibited
from trapping performing borrowers into the high-cost credit world,
especially when the motivation to do so is to keep good borrowers out
of the competition's reach.
Referral to Credit Counseling
The Board should institute a requirement for
pre-loan counseling for all homeowners applying for loans that will
result in debt payments exceeding 40% of income.
Conversations with dozens of victims of home
loan scams reveal that many of them did not understand the impact of
interest rates and points on the cost of a loan. Many of them did
not realize that they could have qualified for a cheaper source of
credit elsewhere or that there was a better alternative to achieve
their financial goals. Many also did not understand the relationship
between their monthly income and new monthly payments since they were
told they could qualify for loans simply because they had equity in
their homes.
Clearly, many abusive loans could have been
averted if the borrowers had received pre-loan counseling from an
independent consumer agency. Victims could have been made aware of
lower-cost financing programs. Counseling can help the borrower
determine how much money he needs to borrow-rather than simply taking
what the lender offers-and to ensure that the loan documents are
completed fully and accurately.
Mandatory counseling for borrowers whose total
monthly debt payments (including non-mortgage payments) exceeds 40%
of monthly income would create a disincentive for scammers to prey on
the elderly and naïve, and would allow counselors to alert law
enforcement officials about lenders exhibiting illegal or abusive
practices. Counselors could include HUD approved counseling
agencies, nonprofit community counseling services and community
housing or consumer affairs organizations, those qualified to deliver
financial counseling with no stake in the outcome.
While counseling would be mandatory, the
borrower would still be free to choose to enter into a loan
transaction against the counselor's advice. Some borrowers may make
this choice, but conversations with home equity loan scam victims
indicate that they would have looked for alternatives if they had
been given adequate information about the risks and nature of
unfavorable loan terms.
The Board should require counseling for
borrowers seeking to refinance an existing loan which has gone into
default.
Homeowners on the verge of losing their homes
are desperate for relief. They are among the most vulnerable of
potential victims. Unfortunately, in many cases, it is often better
to sell the home at the outset of the foreclosure process than to try
rescue measures that may lead to a total loss of equity.
Homeowners who have had notices of default
filed against them often are bombarded with rescue offers from
lenders, mortgage brokers, attorneys and others. These often lead to
desperate, expensive and ultimately worthless activities-such as
high-rate loans that the homeowner has no chance of repaying. These
pitfalls could be avoided through post-default financial and
homeowner counseling by independent, nonprofit agencies.
HOEPA Disclosures
Loan documents should include a statement, in
bold face type, which clearly states that the borrower is entering
into a contract with terms that exceed general market rates. The
statement should be more direct and clear than what is required by
federal law and written in the language in which the loan
negotiations were conducted.
Consumers Union supports amendments to the
required disclosures that more clearly alert consumers about the
risks associated with high-cost borrowing. We have added our
proposed changes to those recommended the Board and HUD in its 1998
report to the Congress. In addition to requiring written disclosure,
lenders should be required to provide borrowers with oral disclosure
of the contents of the following enhanced HOEPA disclosure:
Consumers Union supports inserting the total
loan amount borrowed in the HOEPA disclosure to help inform the
borrower of exactly how much he or she is borrowing. This would give
borrowers a better idea of how high fees and interest rates increase
the amount of actual indebtedness. In conversations with victims of
predatory lending, we have found that many did not have sufficient,
timely information about the effect of high interest rates and fees
on the amount borrowed and would have looked for other alternatives
if they had known.
The Board could require that HOEPA loan
borrowers receive a complete Truth in Lending disclosure statement
three days before closing. However, receipt of this disclosure
should not be a substitute for an improved HOEPA disclosures as
suggested above.
Open-End Home Equity Lines
Consumers Union is aware that HOEPA does not
cover home-equity lines of credit and that some creditors have
structured loans as open-end to avoid HOEPA's provisions. We believe
that the Board should prohibit the practice of structuring a
home-secured loan as open-end credit in order to evade the provisions
of HOEPA. One way of identifying such spurious open-end credit
transactions is by looking at whether the borrower immediately draws
on the entire credit limit or close to that amount in an initial
transaction.
Community Outreach and Consumer
Education
As mentioned earlier, community education and
outreach is a very important component to the multi-prong approach
that is required to prevent predatory lending. Well-informed
consumers are less likely to fall victim to the multitude of
practices that can ensnare them into expensive and impossible loans
that can cost them their homes. We must emphasize, however, that
community outreach and consumer education efforts alone are not
enough to stop predatory lending. Education efforts cannot be
substitutes for meaningful regulations and laws designed to prevent
the practices that lead to predatory lending. Enforcement of
effective regulations and laws is also a very necessary
component.
Consumers Union recently completed a two-year
grant funded community education project in five San Francisco Bay
Area counties. Our focus was on educating the most likely and most
vulnerable victims of home equity lending fraud-the working poor, or
retired seniors, who bought homes more than 20 years ago and now have
significant equity, but barely any income. In the two-year period,
we conducted over 75 community education seminars and reached more
than 3,000 Bay Area low-income and senior homeowners through
community education seminars and provided brochures in English and
Spanish. Don't Lose Your Home: Home Equity Fraud explains how to
avoid loans with unfair terms; Guarding the Golden Years: Reverse
Mortgages discusses the pros and cons of seniors tapping into the
value of their homes in regular payments for a specified time. We
also gave them important resource information on city and county
sponsored alternative loan programs for home improvements available
to qualified borrowers. We have included copies of our educational
materials with this testimony.
Another important component of our project was
to train direct service providers such as social workers from county
Adult Protective Services agencies to recognize signs of predatory
lending within their client base. Additionally we trained more than
125 members of the California District Attorney's Association on how
to spot equity fraud and abuse.
This is but one example of a community
education project that can be employed to deliver the message about
the dangers of predatory lending. A project such as this could be
easily expanded out into a larger geographic area or could be
duplicated in other locales. With adequate funding, consumer
education on this topic could be much broader in its scope. One
level of a public education campaign can be to reach large
populations through billboards, and other forms of mass advertising.
However, it is still important to get out into the communities that
are most affected by predatory lending and use community leaders to
speak to people about how to protect themselves, and what to do if
they have already fallen prey to a predatory lender.
Pre-loan counseling is a very important form of
consumer education which we support and discussed earlier. To make
assistance accessible, realtors and title insurers should help fund
free or low-cost counseling and education programs administered by
nonprofit groups or governmental agencies.
CONCLUSION
Consumers Union thanks you for this opportunity
to share our recommendations with the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. In March 2000, the New York Times, in an
extraordinary report on subprime lending, reported that the subprime
industry has boomed, growing from a $20 billion dollar industry in
1993 to a $150 billion dollar industry in 1998. Most of the reports
of abusive and fraudulent home equity lending practices we have
received from consumers involve subprime lenders, the segment of the
lending industry that generates the bulk of HOEPA loans. The time is
long overdue to expand consumer protections within HOEPA so that as
the subprime industry grows, current pitfalls and hazards for
consumers do not expand as well.
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(1) Consumers Union, publisher
of Consumer Reports, is an independent, nonprofit testing and
information gathering organization, serving only the consumer. We
are a comprehensive source of unbiased advice about products and
services, personal finance, health, nutrition, and other consumer
concerns. Since 1936, our mission has been to test products, inform
the public, and protect consumers.
(2) For example, if the 10-year Treasury security rate was at 8 percent, a 10-year home equity loan would be covered by the Act if its interest rate was 18 percent or higher.