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2. Nuclear Power. The nuclear
power industry began in a surge of optimism and hope. We were going to turn
the awesome power of the atom from its debut as a devastating weapon of destruction,
into a peaceful servant of humanity.(46) Industry
and government, sensitive to the public perceptions associated with images
of mushroom clouds, launched a major campaign to teach Americans to love atomic
power. "Our Friend the Atom" was the theme of popular educational
materials, including a Disney movie.(47) Energy-industry
brochures predicted an age of "infinite energy." Electricity would
be too cheap to meter; small, portable atomic power plants would drive cars,
airplanes, even wristwatches.
The love affair didn't last long. As the atomic energy industry grew, so did its problems. Some scientists pointed out significant risks of a large atomic energy industry, and urged stronger safety measures.(48,49,50) Risk concerns spanned a wide range, from chronic low-level radioactive emissions in the immediate vicinity of a nuclear plant to catastrophic accidents, and also included longer-term environmental issues, such as how to dispose of radioactive wastes and spent fuel.(51,52) These risks needed to be assessed, and the public needed to be reassured that they were acceptably small. Some citizens opposed the development of a nuclear industry at all, on grounds that it was too dangerous, and many others objected to specific proposals to build nuclear plants in their "back yards."
Proponents of nuclear power responded to growing public opposition with science and with government regulation. Extensive research was conducted on safety systems for power plants, on risks of exposure to radiation, and on many related topics. While much of this work was sponsored by the industry or by pro-nuclear government agencies, many independent scientific groups and academic researchers also participated, and most of the work, while always subject to debate, was relatively objective and credible. In general, the assessments seemed to agree that the risks of nuclear power, while not trivial, were manageable.(53,54)
The industry also supported strong Federal regulation, to convince the public that plants were being designed and operated safely. The Atomic Energy Commission, the agency set up initially to oversee the nuclear industry, had an awkward dual role, both promoting nuclear power and regulating the industry. In 1974, as part of a broader reorganization of the Federal energy agencies, the AEC was split up and a new, more independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission was established. (55)
But things did not get better. Solutions to some of the industry's technical problems, such as its need to dispose of high-level radioactive wastes, remained elusive, for both scientific and political reasons. And in March of 1979, disaster struck, when the Three Mile Island reactor in Pennsylvania experienced the worst accident to date in the history of U.S. commercial nuclear power. Although a catastrophic release of radiation was avoided, retrospective study of the event suggested it came very close.(56) And the TMI incident played out a scenario the industry had long assured the public simply could not happen, given all the safeguards that were in place.
Epidemiologists are still debating the actual impacts the radiation released by TMI may have had on public health, but the incident's effect on the health of the nuclear industry was less difficult to measure. Public skepticism about the industry's and the regulatory system's ability to predict and prevent nuclear accidents soared. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission substantially tightened its safety procedures and its oversight of the industry in the wake of TMI,(57) but those changes may not have significantly altered most citizens' perceptions of the risks of nuclear power plants.
For the past two decades, the American nuclear power industry has been moribund. A combination of NIMBY opposition, broader public and scientific concerns about safety, difficult waste and security problems, regulatory delays and costs, soaring construction costs and high operating costs has made nuclear energy unprofitable, and no U.S. utilities have begun building a new atomic power plant for more than 20 years.(58) This is not the case in other countries; much of Europe's electricity now comes from nuclear power, while here in the U.S., where the technology was invented, we have made very limited use of it. Instead, America has met its growing appetite for energy mainly by burning fossil fuels, widening our lead as the world's top emitter of carbon dioxide.(59)
What lessons can the biotechnology industry learn from our national experience with nuclear power? First, intensive, scientifically sound research aimed at assessing risks may not be enough to demonstrate safety. High-quality, relatively objective science may not satisfy the public that questions have been adequately answered; even unbiased risk assessments may simply fail to foresee problems, or be mistaken in their estimates. The greatest lesson the public has learned from TMI appears to be that risk assessment is a fallible science. Second, strong Federal regulation of the nuclear industry did not avert problems. Quite aside from whether the NRC is independent enough, regulation has not prevented accidents, including many less serious than TMI.
Third, public relations campaigns can backfire when later events suggest that their core message is untrue. The "our friend the atom" campaign was masterful propaganda, but it created an image of nuclear power that was too benign. When real scientific debates and evidence of non-trivial risks surfaced, the public reacted not just with alarm but also with anger at having been misled. Trust in the industry-government pro-nuclear complex and its promises was eroded, and has proved extremely difficult to rebuild.
While none of the nuclear accidents thus far has had demonstrably severe public health impacts, the industry has not shaken a perception that the next event could be a lot worse. For complex reasons, the prevailing American public sentiment today seems to be that nuclear power, whatever its benefits, is not worth the costs and the risks. Supporters of nuclear power have largely failed to shift debate to the bigger picture-i.e., that all forms of energy production have risks and costs, and that societies need to compare options and choose the ones we can best afford and whose risks are most acceptable, rather than judge one technology in isolation.
Notes:
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46. Holdren, J.P. (1992), The Transition to Costlier Energy,
in L. Schipper and A.S. Myers, Eds., Energy Efficiency and Human Activity.
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
47. Walt Disney Studios produced a movie by that title, and subsequently published
a book for young readers: Haber, H. (1956), The Walt Disney Story of Our Friend
The Atom. New York: Simon and Schuster.
48. Gofman, J.W. and A. Tamplin (1971), Poisoned Power. Emmaus, PA: Rodale
Press.
49. Holdren, J.P. (1974), Hazards of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 30(8): 14-23.
50. Kendall, H.W. (1975) Nuclear Power Risks: A Review of the Report of the
APS Study Group on Light Water Reactor Safety. Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned
Scientists.
51. Shapley, D. (1971), Plutonium: Reactor proliferation threatens a black
market. Science 172:143-146.
52. Balogh, B. (1991), Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation
in American Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945-1975. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press.
53. Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group (1977), Nuclear Power Issues and Choices.
Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
54. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1975), Reactor Safety Study. An Assessment
of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants. WASH-1400, NUREG-75
/014. Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service.
55. Ehrlich, P.R., A.H. Ehrlich and J.P. Holdren (1977), Ecoscience: Population,
Resources, Environment. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman. (History of the AEC/NRC
discussed on page 404.)
56. Kemeny, J.G., Chairman (1979), Report of the President's Commission on
the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
57. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (undated), Three Mile Island 2 Accident.
A summary of the history and consequences of the TMI accident, available on
the NRC web site at http://www.nrc.gov/OPA/gmo/tip/tmi.htm.
58. See Holdren (1992), op. cit, (Note 46).
59. Clark, S.L. (1991), Fight Global Warming. New York: Environmental Defense
Fund.
