CONSUMER INFORMATION ON ROLLOVER EVALUATIONS:
A CONSUMER PERSPECTIVE

R. DAVID PITTLE, PH.D.
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, TECHNICAL POLICY

CONSUMERS UNION(1)
Publisher of CONSUMER REPORTS

SAE/TOPTEC CONFERENCE ON ROLLOVER
SCOTTSDALE, AZ
April 22, 2002

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At the SAE Conference on Rollover and Stability Control in May 2000, I presented CU's views on the use of electronic stability control (ESC) in reducing rollover risks, with special emphasis on Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs). I presented the perspective of an economically disinterested product testing organization that had accumulated experience evaluating the performance of these systems as they appear in modern vehicles, and under test conditions that reflect real world conditions. Today, nearly two years later, we have considerably more experience, and I would like to give you a short summary of those results.

Since May 2000, we have tested 27 vehicles equipped with electronic stability control, six of which were SUVs. Stability control made a marked performance improvement in our emergency avoidance maneuver tests on all but two of the 27 (not the Toyota Highlander and not the Acura TL). The SUVs tested were Toyota's Land Cruiser, Highlander and 4Runner, the BMW X5, the Mercedes-Benz ML 430, and the Lexus RX 300. For example, when we tested the 1999 Toyota Land Cruiser, a model without ESC, we found that its emergency handling rated "Poor," and we felt we could not recommend it because of this characteristic. In most other aspects, it was a very fine vehicle. When we later tested the 2001 Land Cruiser, after an electronic stability control system was added as standard equipment, the emergency handling improved and earned a rating of "Fair," enough of an improvement for us to be able to recommend it to our readers.

The Toyota 4Runner is another good illustration of the benefits of stability control. In our September 2001 test report, we wrote, "It (the 4Runner) felt clumsy and imprecise through fast corners and our double-lane change test, though its electronic stability control kicked in aggressively and kept it on course. That helped the vehicle get through the test the fastest." These test results illustrate the benefits of ESC, both for the manufacturer and for the consumer.

We have commended BMW, Mercedes, and Toyota (March 2001 CR) for outfitting virtually all their SUVs (except Toyota's RAV4) with ESC. They are the first automakers to do this, and we think it is an important safety step forward.

Although I am not here today to focus on the details of ESC, it is nonetheless a good transition into my discussion of what we would like to see in a consumer-information program focusing on rollover. One of our common goals should be to see the presence of key safety technologies like ESC reflected in NHTSA's rollover information program, which right now is not the case since NHTSA's star ratings are based solely on a vehicle's static stability factor.

Part of the conference agenda is to discuss the kinds of information consumers need to make rational decisions when they seek, as many consumers do, an automobile that provides the greatest safety for themselves and their families. I will discuss first the long, winding path traveled thus far, but one that we hope will soon lead to a test program that adequately assesses a vehicle's emergency handling and rollover propensity. I will conclude with CU's thoughts about the best ways to communicate comparative safety information. These are especially important consumer issues for choosing a safer Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV).

To begin with, America's love affair with SUVs continues virtually unabated. Nearly one out of every four new vehicles sold in America today is an SUV. They have replaced the family station wagon as the vehicle of choice for hauling kids and gear as near as the supermarket and as far as the soccer field. Consumers get into an SUV and say they feel safer in them. It feels big and roomy, it sits up high off the ground and allows the occupants to see over smaller passenger vehicles on the road. Motorists also feel that in a collision with sedans and coupes, they'll be safer because they are in a bigger and heavier vehicle-which indeed they are. (That doesn't say much for the safety of our friends and family members in those sedans and coupes.)

But all this comes at a high cost to the drivers and passengers of SUVs. Not only do they pay more dollars at the pump more frequently, they also pay more in the personal costs of deaths and injuries from rollovers-especially single-vehicle rollovers. Rep. Ed Markey (D-Mass) stated the problem clearly when he introduced an amendment to the TREAD Act of 2000 that mandated NHTSA to develop dynamic on-road tests for the purpose of providing consumer information on rollover and emergency handling:

What can a consumer do until NHTSA finishes its work on that test program? One way consumers have been trying to reduce their automotive risks in general is by seeking safety information before they make a purchase. Public surveys over the past several years indicate that many car buyers place safety among their top two or three considerations. This is a very different marketplace than it was 20 or 30 years ago. Safety is now a much more important factor for consumers than it once had been. And the market itself reflects that change: We now see ads from automakers promoting the high safety rating their vehicles have earned in crash tests.

At Consumer Reports, we see first hand how highly consumers value and seek to measure the hidden dimension of an auto's safety.

Returning to the subject of emergency handling and rollover, through our various Consumer Reports-based publications, CU has been providing consumers with information about emergency handling since 1973. In that year, we developed an emergency-avoidance-maneuver test to help evaluate a vehicle's emergency handling characteristics, basing it on similar tests developed by General Motors during the 1960s. Since 1973, this test has been a regular part of every vehicle's evaluation, and well over 1,100 vehicles have been evaluated on this course. It is an integral part of our emergency handling score, which provides useful information to consumers.

Rollover safety per se has concerned safety experts since the 1950's and 1960's, beginning with the controversies surrounding the Jeep CJ's. Consumers Union's concern was acutely heightened in 1988, when the Suzuki Samurai tipped up abruptly on two wheels during a non-routine sequence of our emergency handling tests. In order to properly evaluate the phenomenon we had observed, our auto engineers adjusted the course to determine whether that Samurai tip-up was an anomaly, and equally important, to determine how the other three SUVs in the test group would perform when traversing the same path as that of the Samurai's first tip-up. The adjusted course is slightly shorter; the steering reversal is sharper; and the speed is slower (35-45 mph rather than 45-55 mph), as might be required in a suburban or urban setting. This is now known as our "short course" and has been in use by us since 1988. In subsequent test sequences during that 1988 test, the Samurai tipped up severely, while the other three SUVs in the group remained stable throughout this "short course" avoidance-maneuver testing. As a result of its performance in all of these tests, Consumer Reports rated the Samurai "Not Acceptable." We believed then-and continue to believe today-that such performance is unreasonably dangerous for consumers.(3)

Since 1988, we have tested 85 SUVs in the short course. In addition to the Samurai, two other SUVs, the 1995-96 Isuzu Trooper and the 2001 Mitsubishi Montero Limited, tipped up severely and were rated Not Acceptable. There were six other SUVs whose emergency handling was rated Poor because of their performance in this test.

Based on the 1988 test results, CU petitioned NHTSA requesting the establishment of a stability standard to protect against unreasonable risk of rollover in all vehicles. In granting CU's petition, NHTSA noted that the petition is "consistent with the Agency's steps to address the rollover problem."

A bit more history is needed here. In 1992, as a result of studies relating to CU's 1988 petition for a rollover standard, NHTSA announced its intention to develop a rule to provide consumers with information on a vehicle's propensity to roll over. According to the agency, "The number of rollovers might be reduced if consumers better understand the risk of rollover associated with different vehicle types and models." We note that NHTSA's statement from 1988 is almost identical to the statement in the consumer information proposal the agency finalized in January 2001.

In 1994, NHTSA halted its rulemaking on a universal stability standard, concluding that a standard applicable to all vehicles would require the redesign of nearly all SUVs, vans and pick-up trucks-at an unacceptably high cost. At the same time, NHTSA said that it favored a consumer information rule on rollover propensity, stating once again the agency's goal of influencing "consumers to purchase more stable vehicles." Please note my emphasis on consumers purchasing "… more stable vehicles." Implicitly, consumers would somehow learn which vehicles are properly characterized as "more stable vehicles."

In 1996, during tests conducted by CU on a group of SUVs, the Isuzu Trooper, tipped up suddenly and severely onto two wheels during several runs on our short course. When the testing was completed, we petitioned NHTSA again, this time requesting the development of a dynamic test that would produce meaningful, comparative data on the emergency-handling characteristics of different makes and models of SUVs. CU also asked NHTSA to make the information from that test available to consumers. In 1997, NHTSA granted CU's petition, calling CU a "welcome partner," and noting that CU has "focused the public's attention on rollover and provided a wealth of consumer information to the car-buying public."

In 1998, NHTSA proposed the use of larger warning labels highlighting the dangers of rollovers in SUVs and stressing the use of seatbelts. CU noted in its comments to the agency that to the extent these new labels encourage seat belt use, that would be helpful and beneficial-even if only a few more occupants starting using seat belts. But we also added that, in our opinion, these labels, indeed any labels, "won't be an effective deterrent to rollovers."

Also in 1998, CU and industry engineers attended a demonstration of NHTSA's rollover test development, carried out pursuant to CU's 1996 petition. This testing was done at NHTSA's Vehicle Research and Testing Center (VRTC) in East Liberty, Ohio. From what we saw there, the CU staff came away encouraged that significant progress on developing dynamic rollover tests was underway.

Then, in the spring of 2000, NHTSA surprised us all (or most of us at least) and proposed the adoption of the decades-old static stability factor as the long-awaited measure of rollover propensity, and a Rollover Resistance Rating system based on the relationship between a vehicle's SSF and a statistical analysis of previous rollover accidents. There were strong negative reactions from all quarters: from Congress, from industry, and from CU and other consumer organizations. The program was nevertheless implemented on January 1, 2001, but Congress directed that the National Academy of Sciences conduct a study assessing the scientific validity of SSF as an appropriate measure of rollover resistance.

In November 2000 during the seemingly endless unfolding of the Ford/Firestone debacle, Congress passed a comprehensive bill, the TREAD Act, that included a provision directing NHTSA to develop a dynamic test protocol for rollover by November 1, 2002. The results from such tests were to be made available to consumers through a consumer information program.

Meanwhile, the NAS was forming a special committee to address its two-fold congressional mandate to assess the scientific validity of NHTSA's basing its rollover resistance program on the SSF, and to assess the viability of using dynamic test protocols.

Static Stability Factor vs. Dynamic Testing

Stepping back for a moment, I should emphasize that CU has long been a proponent of dynamic testing. Our 1996 petition specifically asked the agency to develop a dynamic test for predicting and comparing the rollover propensity of SUVs. We do not doubt the important roles that track-width and center-of-gravity height play in rollover stability. Indeed, all other things being equal, a vehicle with a wider track and a lower center of gravity is more stable and less likely to tip up or roll over in both untripped and tripped emergencies. But, as a general rule, all other things are not equal, whether comparing vehicles within a class or between classes. If two vehicles have similar dimensions, they will likely receive the same star rating. Yet, the design and performance of such critical elements as the suspension, the tires, and the presence or absence of ESC-all working as a single system-are not accounted for. Worse, using SSF alone can put misinformation into the hands of consumers. CU's auto engineers believe there are at least five clear benefits of dynamic testing over the use of static measures:

Benefits of Dynamic Testing

While NHTSA's SSF rating system differentiates fairly well between sedans, minivans, pickups and SUVs as classes, it does not differentiate well for vehicles within each class. Moreover, the current approach can lead to some questionable results. Under NHTSA's existing rating system, most sedans receive 4 or 5 stars, while most SUVs are rated only 2 or 3 stars. Minivans and pickups fall in between. Not much differentiation. And within the 2-star rating group, for example, the old Chevrolet Lumina APV (sometimes nicknamed "the dustbuster") and the Suzuki Samurai would receive the same 2-star rating. Yet, from our testing, we do not believe these two vehicles have the same emergency handling characteristics or propensity for rollover in real world emergency maneuvers. We believe a dynamic test program, in contrast, would illuminate the differences in more realistic terms.

Now we come to the final report of the NAS committee, the most recent voice to be heard on what constitutes appropriate tests for rollover propensity. After an open and lengthy investigation, where the Committee met publicly with all major stakeholders and visited several test tracks, it issued its report in February. With regard to rollover and emergency handling test protocols, the findings were succinct, clear, and direct:

In our opinion, these findings are powerful and unequivocal. They should impel NHTSA to implement dynamic testing protocols in a timely manner, and then report their results to consumers.

Which brings me to the last section of my remarks-the benefits of having an accurate consumer information program, based on dynamic tests and presented as a comparative safety yardstick that enables consumers to make informed car-buying decisions.

The Inherent Benefits of a Consumer Information Program

As you all know, NHTSA regularly performs crash tests on new vehicles to help consumers learn how well they protect vehicle occupants in crashes. In that way, consumers can compare vehicle performance and make their choice based on independent testing. NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) currently enjoys great popularity and use with the car-buying public. NHTSA data indicate that its NCAP website gets one million hits per year. As I said earlier, the public is hungry for safety information, and the frontal and side crash information NHTSA currently provides through NCAP meets an important consumer need.

There is also no question that NHTSA's crash-testing program has led to safer cars on the road. In 1985, just 30 percent of the 94 vehicles rated by NHTSA received high frontal-crash scores. By 2001, 90 percent of the 138 new vehicles rated earned four or five stars, the top ratings. Clearly, making these test results public has produced a strong incentive for automakers to improve how well their vehicles perform in these tests, and, by extension, how well they protect the occupants in real world crashes.

The NAS report also recognizes the benefits of test-based consumer information programs:

The report also notes that IIHS's offset frontal crash test program has resulted in significant improvements in vehicle design: among 32 updated vehicle designs tested since 1995, 20 earned improved offset crash ratings (IIHS 2001).

This brings us to the critical question of what should a consumer-friendly information program encompass in order for its users to be able to make informed car-buying decisions. In its final report, the NAS Committee suggested that NHTSA could be doing a better job by:

We agree with these thoughtful conclusions. NHTSA should implement the NAS recommendations promptly, since they will enhance auto safety-which, after all, is NHTSA's primary goal.

SUMMARY

To summarize, we have come a long way from the early Jeep CJ controversies, from NHTSA's first efforts to develop rollover tests, and from the controversies about what constitutes unreasonable risks. We are all now more experienced and more safety conscious. The consumer needs us to apply our best efforts to bring this risk under control now.

In the end, these vehicles will not become safer and more stable by the words that we say here. For starters, it will depend heavily on what NHTSA finally develops as an on-road test program for stability and emergency handling.

But it will also depend on something else, something that the NAS Committee alluded to in its final report:

We are all major stakeholders in solving this problem, and we are at a crossroads. Consumers are being injured and killed at appallingly high rates in SUV rollovers. Congress has spoken unanimously on the need for dynamic tests to measure every vehicle's rollover propensity. And a prestigious group of nationally recognized experts from across the country has concluded that such tests are technically feasible and necessary for assessing the rollover propensity of your products. Using this approach should result in safer vehicles on the road

So-how you as engineers and designers respond to what NHTSA proposes for measuring and rating rollover is critical, and, I believe, will have broad historical consequences. If automakers choose to fight the momentum for the progress that is sought and is so desperately needed, consumers will be poorly served and their cynicism about manufacturers will only deepen. It will be recorded as the time the auto industry ducked its responsibility and missed a unique opportunity.

If, instead, your company embraces the momentum for more safety as a call for vigorous action, then you will be empowered to unleash your creativity and your broad skills to design and build safer, more stable vehicles. Manufacturers will be rewarded in the marketplace, and consumers will be rewarded with fewer tragic rollovers. Everybody can win. And they should-the time has come.

Thank you.

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Footnotes:

(1) Consumers Union is an independent, nonprofit membership organization chartered in 1936 under the laws of the State of New York to provide consumers with information, education and counsel about goods, services, health, and personal finance; and to initiate and cooperate with individual and group efforts to maintain and enhance the quality of life for consumers. Consumers Union's income is derived solely from the sale of Consumer Reports, its other publications and from noncommercial contributions, grants and fees. More than five million consumers per year purchase CU's unbiased, expert information from the Consumer Reports family of products, which includes Consumer Reports magazine, ConsumerReports.org, Consumer Reports on Health, Consumer Reports Travel Letter, and a variety of other special publications and information services. In addition to reports on Consumers Union's own product testing, Consumer Reports and ConsumerReports.org regularly carry articles on health, product safety, marketplace economics and legislative, judicial and regulatory actions that affect consumer welfare. Consumers Union's publications carry no advertising and receive no commercial support.

(2) September 21, 2000, HOUSE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TRADE & CONSUMER PROTECTION MARKUP

(3) Suzuki has challenged our findings in litigation filed in 1996. A federal judge threw out this suit before trial, and Suzuki's appeal of that decision is pending.