Can Informed Consumers Force a Safer Marketplace? Meaningful Product Information is Key

July 2004 NEWS UPDATE: Suzuki and Consumers Union Agree on Dismissal of Lawsuit

We want to thank our readers who have supported Consumers Union throughout the course of this litigation. The case has been dismissed by joint agreement, and it cannot be re-filed. We no longer suggest that you write to Suzuki or General Motors about the case. CU continues to stand fully behind its testing and report on the Samurai, has issued no retraction or correction, and has paid nothing to Suzuki. Click on this link to see the full text of the Joint Public Statement announcing the resolution of the case.

"Can Informed Consumers Force A Safer Marketplace?
Meaningful Product Information is Key"

R. David Pittle, Ph.D.
Senior Vice President
Technical Policy

CONSUMERS UNION(1)
Publisher of CONSUMER REPORTS

SAE Government/Industry Meeting
"Moving Forward Together"

Washington, DC
May 13, 2002

I speak to you today as a former professor of electrical engineering, a former president of a large, citizen-action consumer group, a former consumer member of several industry standards-setting groups, a former Commissioner at the U. S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, and finally, the former Technical Director and current Senior Vice-President for Technical Policy at Consumers Union, the independent, non-profit publisher of Consumer Reports.

After more than 30 years in the field of risk assessment, product evaluation, and injury reduction in pursuit of a fairer, safer, and more just marketplace, I have learned that the bedrock of any successful risk reduction program relies on two fundamental truths.

First, it is far easier and generally cheaper in the long run to design and manufacture safer products that incorporate predictable consumer behavior as design parameters than it is to rely on changing consumer behavior to compensate for dangerous designs. To be sure, consumers have a fundamental obligation to act responsibly-drinking and driving, eating and driving, reading and driving too often lead to senseless accidents. It would be a difficult challenge for a manufacturer to design around these behaviors.

But that is not nearly the full picture. In everyday driving, dangerous situations arise frequently that are predictable in type but unpredictable in time of occurrence. They are not anyone's "fault," but they can be devastating nonetheless. If we are serious about reducing risks to consumers, manufacturers must design their products to mitigate these realities of the road and include known consumer behavior patterns in those designs-and be ready to change the design when a safety problem surfaces.

Second, you cannot sticker over a safety problem with gummed labels and instruction books, especially those that require consumers to change their normal behavior patterns or act in a counterintuitive manner. Of course, informing consumers at critical moments with vital information can be effective when the consumer has control over the situation, such as "don't take this prescription drug with alcohol." In such situations, this may be the only way to go.

But vague or generic advice about some future hazard is quite different. For example, tiny labels on drain cleaners, aspirin, and scented furniture polishes advising you to "Keep out of the reach of children" didn't work very well. Far too many kids died or were seriously injured by ingesting these chemical hazards. Child Resistant Closures were mandated and have been hugely effective in reducing these horrible accidents. In general, we must recognize and respect the reality that people pretty much act the way they act, and that their regular, everyday behavior can't be manipulated very easily?if at all. Relying on labels as the primary defense to reduce most product risks will not bring about the level of change needed.

As another example, labels on sport utility vehicles (SUVs) warning that they have a "higher rollover risk" and to "avoid abrupt maneuvers", are informative but hard to implement when you are suddenly confronted by an emergency. Like an intermittent electrical failure, you never know how, or where, or when that emergency will occur. When a child or deer suddenly and without warning darts in front of your vehicle or a large object falls off the truck in front of you, you must make a split-second decision to avoid a tragedy. In panic situations, you do whatever it takes-including make a sudden sharp turn. And if that turn results in a rollover, you are in grave trouble, even though you once read the warning label and maybe even remembered what it said.

The point is that a consumer information program designed to warn consumers of a potential hazard, and that relies primarily on changing the consumer's behavior to avoid the hazard (without regard to the product's design) has little chance of improving the safety of the marketplace. In my opinion, a more effective safety information program will be based on the reverse: The focus should be on evaluating the performance and behavior of the product itself rather than on evaluating the performance and behavior of the user. It would be useful to all consumers, regardless of age, gender, level of education, economic status, etc., and it would allow the consumer to choose products based on an independent assessment of the often hidden dimension of the product's safety.

Consumer Reports' Cornerstones-Independent, Unbiased, Expert

This philosophy guides our testing and ultimately forms the basis of how we provide comparative product information at Consumers Union. At CU, we evaluate products in a manner that incorporates our understanding of the consumer's anticipated use-behavior. We pay careful attention to what we assess the consumer is likely to do, as well as what the manufacturer advises the consumer to do. Sometimes the two are quite different, and often we will test for both scenarios.

In order to perform these comparative tests every year on thousands of consumer products, we use our 50 different state-of-the-art laboratories in Yonkers, NY. To evaluate some 45 new cars and trucks each year, we use our 327-acre auto test facility, with its own track, in East Haddam, CT.

In order to conduct our work objectively and without bias, and at the same time earn and maintain the trust of consumers, we go to great lengths to be independent of the suppliers of the products and services we evaluate. For example, Consumer Reports magazine, as well as our Web site, www.ConsumerReports.org, does not accept any outside advertising. The same is true of our other publications. Our nearly 5 million magazine and online subscribers can be assured that our ratings are free from special treatment or influence by any manufacturer, distributor or retailer. We have been free of outside ads since our inception 66 years ago, and Consumer Reports is still among the top dozen circulating magazines in the country.

Another component of our independence is that we do not accept test samples-free or otherwise-from any manufacturer. We buy all our test samples on the open market with cash or credit card, just as a consumer would. And we don't accept any contributions, grants, or gifts of any kind from any commercial entity, especially those whose products or services we might rate. We make every effort we can to eliminate even the slightest chance that bias could creep into our work. To this end, each year we require a statement summarizing the financial investments from every employee. This information helps us assure that no one's job assignment creates even the appearance of a conflict of interest or commercial bias.

In the end, our goal is to provide consumers with independent, unbiased comparative information that empowers them to make the most informed purchasing decisions and to ultimately improve the marketplace. There are many instances where, after we published our findings, manufacturers made significant and positive changes to their products. For example,

Deck treatments:

· In June 1998, Consumer Reports tested deck treatments and found that nearly half the treatments left deck boards looking pretty bad after 20 months, and leaving very few models to recommend.

· In an October 12, 1998 article in Chemical & Engineering News, the writer cited the CR June '98 report and quoted someone from the industry who made the following statement. "That report has stimulated a lot of activity in the evaluation of light stabilizers to help these companies improve their products, especially those that did not fare so well." The article went on to note that "Consumer Reports has given strong customer feedback to the manufacturers of deck coatings, and it seems many have heard the message."

· Our June 1999 follow-up article stated that new products seemed to have been improved, and our engineers have noted that the labels on deck treatments now more accurately reflect what consumers can expect from the product.

Door Locks:

· In a February 1990 report on door locks, Consumer Reports found in its first round of testing that a simple kick was often enough to defeat a door lock. The part of the lock that usually gave way was the strike-the metal plate that attaches to the door jamb and receives the lock's bolt or latch.

· As a second test, we replaced the typical short screws provided for the strike plate with three-inch screws, which significantly improved the performance of many of the locks, including nearly all the surface-mounted dead-bolt locks.

· When we tested door locks in September 1998, we found that many locks came with a substantial strike plate along with three-inch mounting screws.

Toyota Land Cruiser:

· When we tested the 1999 Toyota Land Cruiser, we found that in our emergency handling tests, it rated "Poor," and we felt we could not recommend it because of this characteristic. In most other aspects, it scored well in our tests.

· In our follow-up tests of the 2001 Land Cruiser, after an electronic stability control system was added as standard equipment, the emergency handling improved and earned a rating of "Fair," in our judgement, enough of an improvement for us to recommend it to our readers.

These examples illustrate the value of consumer information based on independent, objective, comparative product testing, and how those test results can lead to an improved marketplace.

Comparative Automotive Consumer Information

There is no area where this has been more evident to us than on the automotive front. As you all know, NHTSA regularly performs crash tests on new vehicles to help consumers assess how well they protect vehicle occupants in frontal crashes. Using NHTSA's test data, consumers can compare vehicle performance and make their choice based on independent testing. NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) currently enjoys great popularity and use with the car-buying public. Consumer Reports disseminates the information widely each year, especially in our Annual Auto Issue in April.

There is also no question that NHTSA's crash-testing and consumer information programs have led to safer cars on the road. In 1985, just 30 percent of the 94 vehicles rated by NHTSA received high frontal-crash scores. By 2001, 90 percent of the 138 new vehicles rated earned four or five stars, the top ratings. Clearly, making these test results public has produced a strong incentive for automakers to improve how well their vehicles perform in these tests, and, by extension, how well they protect the occupants in real world crashes. Moreover, safety has become an important marketing and sales tool, which is a plus for consumers.

Indeed, the February 2002 National Academy of Sciences committee report on consumer rollover information also recognized the benefits of test-based consumer information programs:

The report also notes that the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety's (IIHS) offset frontal crash test program has resulted in significant improvements in vehicle design: among 32 updated vehicle designs tested since 1995, 20 earned improved offset crash ratings (IIHS 2001). Consumer Reports also disseminates the IIHS offset frontal crash test results.

Consumers are clearly hungry for this type of safety information. At Consumers Union we see this firsthand. One of the most common questions we get: How do I pick the safest vehicle for my family? In our April 2001 Annual Auto Issue, we introduced the Consumer Reports Safety Assessment (CRSA) for our readers. It combines into one overall score all the safety related information we have in our database on new models. For Crash Protection, it includes NHTSA's NCAP results for its frontal crash tests, NHTSA's NCAP results for its side impact crash tests, and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety's results for its offset frontal crash tests. For Accident Avoidance, it covers those elements of our own test evaluations that we believe help a driver avoid an accident. These include braking, emergency handling, driver vision and comfort, and acceleration. That article and the related charts indicating how models compare in terms of this overall safety assessment had a readership of 83%-by far one of the most widely read articles ever published in Consumer Reports.

This brings me to a discussion of the consumer information program that is of extreme interest to all of us right now: NHTSA's consumer information program that provides comparative data on vehicle rollover resistance and helps shoppers assess vehicle performance and stability.

Since January 2001, NHTSA has been using a star ratings system based on a vehicle's static stability factor (SSF). Consumers Union, along with many others, was disappointed with NHTSA's decision to rely solely on a vehicle's SSF to determine rollover propensity.

When Consumers Union petitioned NHTSA for a consumer information program back in 1996, we specifically asked the agency to develop a dynamic test program that would predict and compare the rollover propensity of SUVs. We do not doubt the important roles that track-width and center-of-gravity height play in rollover stability. Indeed, all other things being equal, a vehicle with a wider track and a lower center of gravity is more stable and less likely to tip up or roll over in both untripped and tripped emergencies. But, as a general rule, all other things are not equal, whether comparing vehicles within a class or between classes. If two vehicles have similar dimensions, they will likely receive the same star rating. Yet, the design and performance of such critical elements as the suspension, the tires, and the presence or absence of ESC-all working as a single system-are not accounted for. Worse, using SSF alone can put misinformation into the hands of consumers. CU's auto engineers believe there are at least five clear benefits of dynamic testing over the use of static measures:

Benefits of Dynamic Testing

· Dynamic testing evaluates the performance of the vehicle acting as a whole system, which integrates many more of the important and critical variables than simply track-width and center-of-gravity height.

· Dynamic testing better reflects the stability of the specific vehicle in real-world driving maneuvers.

· Dynamic testing takes into account the slip angle and the vehicle's suspension, which an index or formula cannot.

· Dynamic testing effectively evaluates the tires and suspension systems in transitional maneuvers. As we all know, tire design can play a meaningful role in a vehicle's rollover propensity.

· Dynamic testing rewards active stability control systems, which aid in reducing the chances of rollover. SSF does not. The two Toyota Land Cruisers I spoke of earlier, one with and one without ESC, would get the same star rating in NHTSA's rating system. Yet, we observed during our road tests that the two vehicles behave quite differently when pressed to their handling limits. Since SSF does not take into account this important safety improvement, the SSF rating would remain the same, and consumers would have no way of knowing about the important differences in performance.

While NHTSA's SSF rating system differentiates fairly well between sedans, minivans, pickups and SUVs as classes, it does not differentiate well for vehicles within each class. Moreover, the current approach can lead to some questionable results. Under NHTSA's existing rating system, most sedans receive 4 or 5 stars, while most SUVs are rated only 2 or 3 stars. Minivans and pickups fall in between. Not much differentiation. And within the 2-star rating group, for example, the old Chevrolet Lumina APV (sometimes nicknamed "the dustbuster") and the Suzuki Samurai would receive the same 2-star rating. Yet, from our testing, we do not believe these two vehicles have the same emergency handling characteristics or propensity for rollover in real world emergency maneuvers. We believe a dynamic test program, in contrast, would illuminate the differences in more realistic terms.

The value of dynamic testing was revived during the Ford/Firestone debate and in November 2000, President Clinton signed into law the Transportation Recall Enforcement, Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act. The Act included a provision directing NHTSA to develop a dynamic test for rollover for the purpose of consumer information by November 2002. That deadline is fast-approaching.

The NAS committee, the most recent voice to be heard on what constitutes appropriate tests for rollover propensity concluded:

· Dynamic on-road testing of vehicles is a much needed addition to the Static Stability Factor (SSF) currently used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to evaluate rollover propensity. Indeed, CU can envision a suite of tests that includes SSF, a rollover test(s), and a handling test(s).

· And, in a hugely significant finding, the NAS report stated that the Committee could not identify any insurmountable engineering barriers to the development of a representative dynamic test (or tests) that would differentiate meaningfully among vehicles.

In our opinion, these findings are powerful and unequivocal. They should impel NHTSA to implement dynamic testing protocols in a timely manner.

Summary

To summarize, we have come a long way from the early Jeep CJ controversies, from NHTSA's first efforts to develop rollover tests, and from the controversies about what constitutes unreasonable risks. We are all more experienced and more safety conscious. And the consumer needs us to apply our best efforts to bring this risk under control now.

In the end, these vehicles will not become safer and more stable by the words that we say here. For starters, it will depend heavily on what NHTSA finally develops and proposes as an on-road test program for stability and emergency handling.

But it will also depend on something else, something that the NAS Committee alluded to in its final report:

"Despite the absence of technical barriers to providing more comprehensive consumer information on rollover, the protracted history of NHTSA's rulemaking initiatives on rollover suggests that the agency may encounter difficulties in obtaining support for its actions from all the major stakeholders."

Well now, we are all major stakeholders in solving this problem, and we are at a crossroads. Consumers are being injured and killed at appallingly high rates in SUV rollovers, and they need relief. Congress has spoken unanimously on the need for dynamic tests to measure every vehicle's rollover propensity. And a prestigious group of nationally recognized experts has concluded that such tests are technically feasible and necessary for assessing rollover propensity-and that providing this information to consumers should result in safer vehicles on the road.

The message from the marketplace could not be clearer. The question is "How will we all respond?" If we succeed in "Moving Forward Together," consumers will endure fewer rollovers, and fewer deaths and injuries. On the other hand, if somehow this gets bogged down or watered down, the momentum for safer, more stable vehicles will become frustrated and stymied. We will have missed an important-an almost historic-opportunity. Moving forward together requires good faith by all of us. Let's not blow it. Too many people are depending on us.

Thank you for your attention.

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