Executive
Summary (PDF
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Full
Comments (PDF
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Executive
Summary
Comments in the Federal Communication Commission Proceeding Considering the
Newspaper/Broadcast Ownership Rule
December 3, 2001
The groups joining in these comments represent a wide array of consumer, civil rights, and public interest organizations of various types including direct membership grass roots organizations whose purpose is to promote the public interest in media policy.(1) Our initial comments and the accompanying appendices by Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Benjamin Bagdikian, legal scholar C. Edwin Baker, and Wharton economist Joel Waldfogel demonstrate that the legal and marketplace basis for the Newspaper-Broadcast Cross Ownership Rule is stronger than ever.
The Commission's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking provides neither a sound understanding of the critical role these ownership limits play in our democracy, nor does it offer adequate data or analysis of media market structure to justify changes to this rule. We ground our analysis in:
- the U.S. Constitution's imperative to promote diverse ownership of media as a cornerstone of the checks and balances necessary to preserve a vibrant democracy and
- substantial empirical evidence of current market conditions combined with detailed analysis of economic incentives showing where traditional market forces fall short.
The fundamental question raised in
this proceeding is whether the central goal of the First Amendment as articulated
by the Supreme Court in it's 1945 decision in Associated Press-information dissemination
from diverse and antagonistic sources-can be preserved if newspapers and broadcasting
stations in the same community are commonly owned. A diverse information environment
is an essential prerequisite of American self-governance. It fuels political
participation and animates debate about policy, social norms, cultural values,
individual aspirations and community needs in our society.
In Part I, we recognize that the goal articulated in the Supreme Court in 1945
is an open-ended ever-reaching ideal. If some absolute standard of information
availability and human intellectual capacity had been adopted by the Supreme
Court in 1945, then by 1970 the goal would have certainly been achieved. It
would have been all too easy for public policy to declare victory in the struggle
to deepen and defend civic discourse and our democracy would be much poorer
as a result. Failing to strengthen civic discourse in the face of the information
age-which increases rather than decreases the importance of the media to our
citizens-will sell Americans short. It will dramatically reduce the capacity
for the enlightened debate that the Supreme Court has determined is essential
to American democracy.
We also remind the Commission, in Part I, of its heavy burden in this proceeding.
The Newspaper/Broadcast Ownership Rule has been upheld by the Supreme Court
and explicitly endorsed by Congress for many years. This imperative and governing
administrative law require that the Commission affirmatively justify any change
to this rule. It may not alter it on the basis of an inconclusive record.
Part II shows that the media's characteristics call into question reliance on
certain market principles. Although the market serves many goals well, because
of both democratic principles and characteristics of media as a product, an
unfettered media market is not likely to promote the public interest of the
citizenry. We show, based on the attached analysis of Professors Baker and Waldfogel,
that media as a product is not likely to be produced effectively in the marketplace
and will not serve all audiences efficiently and fairly.
The production and dissemination of newspaper and broadcast media content involve
enormous fixed costs, also called high first-copy costs. To cover these costs,
media producers have a strong incentive to produce content for the largest number
of consumers, presenting material that serves, and does not offend general,
majority tastes. On the other hand, media products are also "non-substitutable"-
for viewers, the NBC sit-com Friends is not interchangeable with the WB's African-American
centered Moesha. CBS Nightly News is not interchangeable with Entertainment
Tonight, or with programming on the Fox News Channel.
Moreover, the media marketplace will not necessarily produce the content people
want to watch. Advertiser preferences often trump viewers' preferences because
the media relies so heavily on advertising revenue. Advertisers, who want people
to be in a receptive mood to learn about their products, do not necessarily
mirror viewers' desires. Finally, media is a public good and possesses significant
"positive externalities." Like clean air and national defense, benefits
accrue to society at large that cannot be captured by the market. For example,
investigative journalism uncovering government waste or consumer fraud benefits
all-even those who do not read the newspaper or advertise on its pages.
Taken together, economists and experts find that these economic characteristics
of media markets lead natural market forces to discriminate against the preferences
of minorities - racial, ethnic, and any other relatively small groups whose
tastes in media differ from the majority's. Eliminating a newspaper or broadcast
voice deprives all citizens of an independent voice and will likely diminish
the welfare of the "non-majority"; their economic and political need
for news, information, and other vital content will be under-served even in
a well-functioning market.
These economic attributes, when combined with media concentration, endanger
democracy. The enormous power that goes with ownership allows media owners to
promote their own interests or biases through the media in a manner harmful
to democratic discourse. Examples of this power are myriad-from GE dictating
that its subsidiary, NBC, not cover GE's pollution of the Hudson River with
toxic (1) chemicals to the television networks'
failure to cover Congress' decision to grant broadcasters free additional spectrum
for digital television.(2) If the Commission declaws
the watchdog by eliminating the Newspaper/Broadcast Ownership rule, we will
lose one of the most crucial pieces of our democracy.
The second half of Part II explains the important and different expertise that
newspapers and broadcasting each bring to the public. This "institutional
diversity" inheres in the financial structure, culture and professional
ethics of each medium. Their differing expertise affects their ability to serve
as checks and balances on each other's business interests and reporting bias.
As Benjamin Bagdikian points out, while separately owned newspapers and broadcasters
generally criticize each other's content, the two media under common ownership
"far from offering mutual criticism
become promotional media publicizing
the other subsidiary."
Part III focuses on traditional economic factors to refute the contention that
a wide range of media are in the same economic market. We show that people rely
on newspapers and broadcast television for different kinds of information, depth
of analysis, spend vastly different amounts of time with each, consume them
in different environments, and pay for them in different ways. In economic terms
these are separate markets with weak substitution effects. This is not to say
that these markets are not adjacent and there is no rivalry, but that, for example,
newspapers' classified advertising mainstay in no way resembles the high-priced
pharmaceutical and auto advertising splashed across national prime time television.
In this section we also show that the data in the Commission's Notice overlook
significant facts about these markets and their players. For example, the Commission
incorrectly concludes that the number of local television newsrooms increased
since 1975, when its own data show that newsrooms decreased by 10 percent.
Finally, in Part IV we cover the rampant consolidation and market power in each
media market. Local newspapers have become print monopolies in about 95 percent
of communities, with very few or our nation's largest cities supporting multiple
papers. Market concentration in cable television ownership is at an all-time
high. We show that each market is highly concentrated and adjacent to one another.
The number of owners of the media on which most Americans rely for information,
television stations and daily newspapers, has fallen dramatically since the
Commission first adopted its rule. One-third of television owners and two-thirds
of newspaper owners have disappeared since 1975. There are half as many owners
of these media today as there were when the rule was adopted.
While the Internet has changed many things in our society, it has not altered
the fundamentals of civic discourse. Compared to the traditional mass media,
the Internet accounts for a miniscule share (less than 5 percent) of individual
news gathering time or industry advertising revenue.(3)
Furthermore, Internet usage is dominated by four providers, which accounted
for fifty percent of user minutes online.(4) And
last year, one-third of all user minutes spent on the Internet were within the
confines of a single company's site-AOL.(5)
Under even conservative antitrust theory, mergers across these markets are dangerous
to competition. We review the well-established literature demonstrating that
harms associated with vertical and conglomerate mergers. These create barriers
to entry, enhance the effectiveness of anti-competitive conduct, and market
players will shift from competition to cooperation. While many product markets
exhibit some imperfections, the implications of market failure in media are
much more profound. These failures will not produce insufficient manufacture
of widgets. They will underproduce information that is essential for citizens
to become educated, meaningful participants in the democratic process.
If local television broadcasters were allowed to merge with local newspapers,
combining the two most important means by which consumers obtain news and information,
the combined owner's editorial bias and economic incentives to under-serve the
needs of minorities will skew public discourse and thereby harm our nation's
democracy. Unless new technologies develop to change the fundamental cost structure
of media information production and dissemination, and until print and television
programming markers become significantly less concentrated and their products
more competitive, the Newspaper/Broadcast Ownership rule will be necessary to
protect the economic and civic interests of consumers.
If the combination of newspaper and broadcast properties in a community leads
newspapers to reduce their in-depth, investigative reporting in order to serve
the more homogenized, superficial, mass-market advertiser-driven needs of broadcast
television, then Justice Brandeis' fear that we not become a society of couch
potatoes, "an inert people," will be realized, undermining "a
fundamental principle of American government."(6)
To meet its obligations under the U.S. Constitution and Congressional directives,
the Commission must maintain the cross-ownership ban. This rule is essential
to protect the diversity of independently owned institutional structures that
disseminate news and information. This will provide "the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources"-the
U.S. Supreme Court's articulation of what "
is essential to the welfare
of the public," interpreting the First Amendment of the Constitution to
mean that "a free press is a condition of a free society."(7)
________
Footnotes:
1 Consumers Union, publisher
of Consumer Reports, is an independent, nonprofit testing and information organization
serving only consumers. CU is online at
www.consumersunion.org. The Consumer Federation of America is the nation's
largest consumer advocacy group, composed of two hundred and eighty state and
local affiliates representing consumer, senior, citizen, low-income, labor,
farm, public power and cooperative organizations, with more than fifty million
individual members. CFA is online at www.consumerfed.org. The Center for Digital
Democracy is committed to preserving the openness and diversity of the Internet
in the broadband era, and to realizing the full potential of digital communications
through the development and encouragement of noncommercial, public interest
programming. The Civil Rights Forum on Communications Policy, a project of the
Tides Center, pursues the twin goals of introducing civil rights principles
and advocacy to the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, and to
reframe the discussion over the role of media in our society around the needs
of communities and the rights of citizens through education, research, and by
forging working links between the civil rights community and others. CRF is
online at www.civilrightsforum.org. The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
was founded in 1950, and consists of more than 185 national organizations, representing
50 million Americans that represent persons of color, women, children, labor
unions, individuals with disabilities, older Americans, major religious groups,
gays and lesbians and civil liberties and human rights groups. LCCR is online
at www.civilrights.org. Media Access Project MAP is a 28 year-old non-profit,
public interest telecommunications law firm which represents civil rights, civil
liberties, consumer, religious and other citizens groups before the FCC, other
federal agencies and the Courts. MAP is online at www.mediaaccess.org.
1Richard Pollack , "Is
GE Mightier Than the Hudson?" The Nation (May 28, 2001).
2 Dean Alger, Megamedia: How Giant Corporations Dominate Mass Media, Distort
Competition, and Endanger Democracy (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998). In fact,
NBC censored a satirical piece on this topic from its television program Saturday
Night Live between its first airing and later broadcasts. See http:/www.freespeech.org/ramfiles/fair.ram
(visited on Dec. 3, 2001).
3 See generally, UCLA Center for Communication Policy, "Surveying the Digital
Future: Year Two" (November 2001).
4 Jupiter Media Metrix Inc., "Online Media Consolidation Offers No Argument
for Media Deregulation" (June 4, 2001)
5 Id.
6 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
7 Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
Consumers
Union Washington, DC Office